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Global Antitakeover Devices
Kobi Kastiell & Adi Libsonl
This Article explores a "hidden" mechanism that insulates management
from hostile takeovers and activist intervention: the global antitakeover device
("GAD"). A GAD is based on the ability of public firms to "mix and match"
between different forms of regulation by cross-listing on multiple stock
exchanges or incorporating in foreign jurisdictions. This action subjects any
hostile engagement with these firms to multiple jurisdictions' regulatory
frameworks and creates regulatory barriers, complexity, and uncertainty. This
Article provides a comprehensive analysis of these GADs, the costs they generate
to potential bidders, and the unique features they possess relative to traditional
antitakeover devices.
GADs are not an isolated phenomenon. Their potential economic impact is
significant, as one in seven firms traded on U.S. exchanges are incorporated or
cross-listed in foreign jurisdictions. Moreover, the impact of these devices could
extend beyond the market for corporate control, as foreign firms could also enjoy
additional insulation from activist hedge funds. The Article also locates GADs
in the wider theoretical literature on cross-listing and offers policy
recommendations for overcoming GADs' insulation effects.
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Introduction
Corporate activity is becoming ever more global. This increased
globalization is reflected both in the growing number of cross-border M&A
transactions in recent years and the pervasive phenomenon of cross-listing,
through which companies raise equity from various financial markets located in
different jurisdictions.1
The globalization of financial corporate activity is based on an important
building block: the ability of the corporation to "mix and match" regulatory
regimes in order to optimize the mix of regulations to which it is subject. A
corporation has the power to alter the form of regulation to which it is subject in
two major ways: (i) by selecting (or changing) the location of incorporation, and
(ii) by selecting (or changing) one or multiple exchanges for listing its securities.2
The ability of a corporation to separate its physical location, or its principal place
of business, from the location of its incorporation or listing permits the
corporation to pick and choose the regulatory schemes it desires.3
The academic literature has long recognized that the globalization of
corporate activity and financial markets impacts many fields, including
1. See infra Section III.A.
2. See Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory
Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652, 1692 (2015).
3. See infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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taxation,4 intellectual property,5 antitrust,6 financial regulation, and foreign
corrupt practices.8 This Article focuses on an additional important dimension of
global corporate activity that has not received much attention from policymakers
and researchers thus far: the effect of globalization on the market for corporate
control and antitakeover defenses.
To illustrate this effect, consider the following example. In November
2007, BHP Billiton announced it was seeking to purchase rival mining company
Rio Tinto Group in an all-stock deal. By its sheer size alone, BHP Billiton's $147
billion dollar "hostile" offer was a landmark deal, aimed at creating the largest
mining company in the world. A formal hostile bid was announced in February
2008. Since both BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto are dual-listed companies with
different arms in separate jurisdictions, the legal complexity of pursuing the offer
was enormous.
In fact, the lawyers who structured this transaction for BHP Billiton were
required to address regulatory requirements across three jurisdictions. This effort
culminated in three separate offers on equivalent terms to the shareholders of Rio
Tinto on multiple stock exchanges. These included an offer in Britain, which is
primarily governed by the U.K. takeover rules; a second offer in Australia, which
is primarily governed by the Australian takeover rules; and a third offer in the
United States, as the U.K. arm of Rio Tinto is also listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). That third offer was governed by U.S. and U.K. law and was
intended as a subset of the British offer. The British and Australian offers were
cross-conditional on each other and had to be closed simultaneously.9 In
addition, BHP Billiton also needed to comply with different accounting regimes
as well as various governance and administration requirements for each
4. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Global Intellectual Property Governance (Under
Construction), 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 349 (2011).
6. See, e.g., Joseph A. Clougherty, Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National
Institutional Variation and Corporate Political Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a Global
Context, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 769 (2005); Jo Seldeslachts et al., Settle for Now But Block for
Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools, 52 J. L. & ECON. 607 (2009).
7. See, e.g., Paul Sebastianutti, What Is This Thing Called International Financial Law?
Part 5, 3 L. & FIN. MARKETS REV. 461 (2009).
8. See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Securities Regulation in the Interconnected, Global
Marketplace, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 23, 2016),
https:Hcorpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/23/securities-regulation-in-the-interconnected-global-
marketplace [https://perma.cc/E873-XK8P].
9. For a description of the complexity of this deal, see The Wonderful Complexity of
BHP-Rio Tinto, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 8, 2008, 2:35 PM),
https:Hdealbook.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/the-wonderful-complexity-of-bhp-rio-tinto
[https://perma.cc/55TJ-BHCQ].
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jurisdiction.10 Slaughter and May, the law firm that advised BHP Billiton, had
more than 30 lawyers working on the project at any one time."1
The most significant costs BHP Billiton incurred resulted from a delay in
the offer process. This delay was driven by the immense complexity and
uncertainty that accompanied disclosure regulations across multiple
jurisdictions. In November 2008, almost a year after the initial acquisition
announcement and as global nickel prices fell dramatically, BHP Billiton
announced that it would drop its takeover bid, citing the "risks to shareholder
value ... [at] an unacceptable level."'
12
Let us now turn from mining to the pharmaceutical world. In April 2015,
the largest hostile takeover attempt in history took place: Mylan, a Dutch generic
pharmaceutical company based in London that was originally incorporated in
Virginia and listed on the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotations (NASDAQ), launched a tender offer to purchase the stocks of
Perrigo, an Irish generic-pharmaceutical company originally incorporated in
Michigan and dual-listed on NASDAQ and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
(TASE).13 The offer contained both cash and stock components.14 At its peak,
the offer was valued at $32.7 billion. 5
Ten years earlier, Perrigo had acquired an Israeli pharmaceutical company
using shares of its own stock.'6 As a result, roughly ten percent of Perrigo's
stocks were still traded on the TASE (in addition to NASDAQ). This made
Perrigo a firm with cross-listed stock stock traded on more than one stock
exchange. 17 When delivering its stock-based offer to Perrigo shareholders,
Mylan effectively had to make a public offer of stock to the Israeli public
10. See Innovative Structures -Dual Listed Companies, ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON 2
(July 2001), https://www.allens.com.au/pubs/pdf/ma/fomaaug0l.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UVF-HFDP].
11. Slaughter and May: All Hands on Deck for BHP 's Rio Tinto Takeover Bid, LAW.
WKLY. (Mar. 25, 2008), https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/632-slaughter-and-may-all-hands-on-
deck-for-bhp-s-rio [https://perma.cc/KQ8G-EP24].
12. Amy Wilson, BHP Billiton Withdraws $66bn Bid for Rival Miner Rio Tinto,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 25, 2008, 8:11 AM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/3517199/BHP-Billiton-withdraws-
66bn-bid-for-rival-miner-Rio-Tinto.html [https:Hperma.cc/93HS-V86R] (quoting BHP Billiton CEO
Marius Kloppers).
13. Liz Hoffman, Mylan Hostile Takeover Bidfor Perrigo is Rare Nail Biter, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 11, 2015, 8:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mylan-hostile-takeover-bid-for-perrigo-is-
rare-nail-biter-1447292062 [https://perma.cc/CWN6-3EEC].
14. Cynthia Koons, Mylan's Hostile Bid for Perrigo Fails, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13,
2015, 8:43 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-13/mylan-s-hostile-bid-for-perrigo-
fails-as-40-of-shares-tendered.
15. Crayton Harrison, Mylan Raises Offer to Acquire Perrigo to $32.7 Billion,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2015, 11:16 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-29/mylan-
increases-takeover-proposal-for-perrigo-to-32-7-billion.
16. Dennis K. Berman, Perrigo to Buy Israeli Drug Maker Agis Industries, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 15, 2004, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 110047210313573591
[https://perma.cc/E7XM-2T3Y].
17. David Wainer & Shoshanna Solomon, Mylan Lists in Tel Aviv in Latest Salvo in




shareholders and thus was required under Israeli securities law to publish a
prospectus.'8 This process involved significant costs and substantial delay to the
hostile bid.
Mylan tried to find a way around this requirement and was willing to list
its stock on the TASE.19 At the same time, Mylan tried to find an exemption to
avoid publishing an additional prospectus. Perrigo objected to Mylan's
attempted exemption and challenged it in court, seeking an injunction against
Mylan directing that it cease all activities relating to the tender offer.20 Even
though both companies were initially U.S. companies listed on NASDAQ, they
found themselves entangled in litigation over the tender offer in an Israeli court.2
Eventually, the court rejected Perrigo's petition,22 and Mylan was permitted to
proceed with the tender offer, which ultimately failed.23
Here again, Perrigo's structure delayed the tender offer process and created
substantial uncertainty, particularly by pursuing a legal battle in a foreign court.
Mylan's executive team and its legal counsel were forced to assess the chances
of winning a case in a foreign forum with which they were relatively unfamiliar.
They also had to guess whether Israel's court and regulatory authorities would
permit Mylan to be listed on the TASE, despite Mylan's poison pill (of dubious
legality under Israeli law).24
Most recently, in November 2017, Broadcom, a semiconductor producer
whose chips power cutting edge smartphones (including the iPhone), offered to
acquire its rival Qualcomm for $130 billion dollars. This would have constituted
18. Securities Law, 5728-1968, § 15(a), SH No. 541 p. 234 (Isr.).
19. David Weiner, Mylan Gets Nod to List Stock in Tel Aviv to Lure Perrigo,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2015, 10:53 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-15/mylan-
gets-nod-to-list-stock-in-tel-aviv-to-lure-perrigo-holders. Regarding the fees Mylan would have had to
pay for listing, see infra note 41.
20. Perrigo objected on the grounds that Mylan did not qualify for listing on the TASE
due to its adoption of a poison pill mechanism and for adopting two separate classes of securities, which
it alleged were prohibited by TASE rules and Israeli securities law. See Amit Steinman, Precedent Tel-
Aviv District Court Ruling: Foreign Companies with a Dual-Class Poison Pill May Register for Trade on
the TASE, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g 7f0b74d9-3588-
4c81-b93f-5aca7075d670 [https://perma.cc/58UX-NLEZ].
21. Mylan hired one of the top Israeli law firms for its representation against Perrigo
and for its listing on the TASE Meitar Liquorik Geva Leshem Tal. Mylan Management Celebrated its
Dual Listing at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange by Taking Part in the Opening Bell Ceremony, TEL AVIV
STOCK EXCHANGE (Nov. 4, 2015),
https:Hinfo.tase.co.il/Eng/NewsandEvents/PRArchive/2015/Pages/PR 20151104.aspx
[https://perma.cc/D2D6-4UCA]; see also CC (TA) 40274-09-15 Perrigo Company Plc v. Mylan N.V.
(Takdin) (2015) (Isr.).
22. See id.
23. Samantha Kareen Nair, Mylan Fails in $26 Billion Takeover Bid for Perrigo,
REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2015, 12:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mylan-nl-perrigo-company-
timeline-idUSKCNOT221W20151113 [https:Hperma.cc/6HYX-6CXP].
24. See Harry Phillips, Cravath Advising Mylan on $29 Billion Unsolicited Perrigo Bid,
GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/38392/cravath-advising-mylan-29-billion-unsolicited-
perrigo-bid [https://perma.cc/9RAQ-QYD4].
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the largest-ever tech deal. 5 Qualcomm rejected the offer, claiming it did not
reflect the company's true value.26 Broadcom then pressured the Qualcomm
board with a proposal to replace all eleven of its directors. However,
Broadcom's country of incorporation and location of headquarters
Singapore turned out to be a significant hurdle that ultimately prevented the
company from pursuing a hostile offer.
Broadcom had previously shifted its corporate domicile to Singapore to
take advantage of the generous tax benefits the country offered.28 The tax
benefits, however, had the downside of attracting harsh U.S. scrutiny of any
attempted acquisitions of a U.S. company by Broadcom. As a foreign company,
Broadcom's hostile bid had to be approved by the U.S. Committee on Foreign
Investments (CFIUS).29 At some point, Broadcom's lawyers considered the
possibility of "redomiciling" the company to Delaware before the Qualcomm
investor vote on the deal. These redomiciling efforts eventually became moot
after U.S. President Donald Trump blocked the takeover, citing national security
concerns.3' Broadcom subsequently withdrew its bid.
Although in this case it was the acquirer, rather than the target, that shifted
its corporate domicile, the antitakeover effect was similar. The differences
between jurisdictions imposed additional barriers and costs on the hostile bidder
and delayed the takeover process. Had Broadcom remained a U.S.-domiciled
company, its hostile offer would not have come under the CFIUS review.
These high-profile global hostile takeover cases illustrate a new type of
"hidden" antitakeover measure that has not been previously discussed in the
literature: the global antitakeover device (GAD). The core idea of GADs is that
additional exposure to foreign legal jurisdictions, through cross-listing or
reincorporation, can be used as an entrenchment device imposing additional
25. Michael J. de la Merced, Broadcom Targets Qualcomm in Largest-Ever Tech Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/business/dealbook/broadcom-
qualcomm-merger.html [https://perma.cc/68GE-6E34].
26. Qualcomm claimed that the Broadcom offer took advantage of a local depression
of its stock price due to its licensing dispute with Apple. See James Fontanella-Kahn, Qualcomm Poised
to Reject Broadcom's Takeover Offer, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/a9e53d16-
c74f-33fl-ad8e- 1977024d8304 [https://perma.cc/EW77-LPRT].
27. Don Clark & Michael J. de la Merced, Broadcom Proposes Unseating Qualcomm
Board as Takeover Fight Escalates, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/technology/broadcom-qualcomm-board.html
[https://perma.cc/A4HZ-LCSA].
28. Bolaji Ojo, Broadcom-Qualcomm: Another Blunder in the Making, EPS NEWS
(Nov. 9, 2017), https:Hepsnews.com/2017/11/09/broadcom-qualcomm-tie-another-blunder-making
[https://perma.cc/L8F3-GS95].
29. See Ted Greenwald, Broadcom Bid Marks Upheaval in Chip Industry, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/broadcom-proposes-to-acquire-qualcomm-for-70-per-
share-1509971816 [https://perma.cc/8MM9-9FQE]; see also Clark & de la Merced, supra note 27.
30. Huileng Tan, Here Are the Real Reasons Trump Blocked Broadcom 's Qualcomm




barriers on hostile bidders for any target firm that is incorporated in a foreign
jurisdiction or listed on a foreign exchange.
Consider, first, the case of a target that is cross-listed in multiple
jurisdictions. To proceed with a hostile bid, a bidder must solicit consent from
shareholders in two (or more) jurisdictions with different regulations for
contested acquisitions. As a result, the bidder must bear various costs, including
the costs associated with launching an additional tender offer; complying with
the disclosure and other substantive corporate law requirements of the foreign
jurisdiction, such as hiring local legal counsel to assist with the preparation of
disclosure documents and advise on foreign corporate and securities law; and,
most importantly, dealing with the delay in the tender offer process and the
substantial uncertainty regarding the success of a hostile bid in a foreign
jurisdiction, including potential legal battles in a foreign court, as in the Mylan
example.
Now consider the case of corporate inversions a relocation of a target's
legal domicile to another jurisdiction. Shifting corporate domicile forces a hostile
bidder to subject itself to the corporate law of the foreign jurisdiction. That
subjection entails a number of legal and financial consequences, including
increased uncertainty, litigation risks, and time delay. Moreover, when the
foreign law includes certain limitations on takeover activity or shareholders'
ability to exercise some of their basic rights, complying with the foreign law
requirements can involve substantial costs for the acquiring company and may
function as a significant bar to takeovers.
These costs are magnified for large takeovers, which require massive loans
from risk-averse underwriting banks. Overall, cross-listing and inversions may
have a chilling effect on the market for corporate control and deter certain
acquirers from attempting takeovers of underperforming targets.
This Article makes several contributions to the existing literature.3' First, it
demonstrates how new forms of antitakeover and anti-activist devices may
emerge in a quickly evolving global financial market and how such devices
should be evaluated by policymakers, market participants, and academics. To
that end, it discusses two central means of creating GADs cross-listing and
corporate inversions and explains how they operate, discusses why they
constitute a genuine concern for investors and regulators, and underscores the
unique features of GADs relative to traditional antitakeover devices.
Second, it expands the existing scholarship on cross-listing by locating
these global antitakeover devices in the wider theoretical literature on cross-
listing. Previous studies on cross-listing highlight different potential motivations
behind this action. Early studies emphasize business motivations, including the
desire to increase the liquidity of the firm's stock and reduce the firm's costs of
31. For more information regarding the anti-takeover literature to which it contributes,
see infra, Section I.D and accompanying footnotes. For more information regarding the cross-listing
literature to which it contributes, see infra Part II and accompanying footnotes.
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raising capital. Later studies focus on different explanations, such as the
willingness of a foreign firm to credibly commit to a regime of enhanced
disclosure and greater exposure in a shareholder-protective legal regime (the
"legal bonding hypothesis"), the willingness to decrease disclosure liabilities
(the "avoidance hypothesis"), and the desire to enhance a firm's presence in
foreign markets (the "commercial bonding hypothesis"). This Article presents
the "insulation hypothesis," which suggests that cross-listing can also be used as
a device that grants management additional insulation from market-disciplinary
forces.
Third, this Article provides preliminary evidence with respect to the
economic significance of GADs. By presenting data on the growing activity of
cross-listing and global M&A activity, it shows that GADs are more prevalent
in the U.S. market than initially presumed. For instance, foreign companies
constitute over fifteen percent of the companies listed on U.S. exchanges, and
thus any hostile bid submitted to these foreign firms is subject to the corporate
law of the foreign jurisdiction in which they are incorporated.32 This suggests
that one out of every seven companies listed in the United States has a potential
GAD in place. The Article also demonstrates how the impact of GADs might
extend beyond the corporate control market, as it could also grant foreign
corporations additional protection from activist interventions by hedge funds.
Finally, this Article presents certain tools for mitigating the antitakeover
and anti-activist protections generated by GADs. In particular, it demonstrates
how investors and policymakers can address GADs' potential entrenchment
effects by increasing their awareness of this phenomenon, by enhancing
cooperation between exchanges around the world, and by subjecting the use of
GADs through cross-listing and inversions to enhanced judicial review in the
appropriate cases.
Before proceeding, a number of framing comments are in order. First, there
is a long-standing, high-profile debate as to whether governance arrangements
that deter hostile bidders or activist investors benefit long-term shareholders.33
A normative evaluation of such measures is beyond the scope of this Article.
From a policy perspective, revealing the role of GADs is important regardless of
one's normative view of these measures. If one accepts the negative view of
32. See infra, Table 2 and note 125
33. For the view that board insulation reduces shareholder value, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013).
For the view that shareholders benefit from antitakeover measures, ee LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER
VALUE MYTH: How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE
PUBLIC 63-73 (2012); William Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010). Regarding the positive evaluation of shareholder activism,
see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015). Regarding the negative evaluation of shareholder activism, see Martijn
Cremers et al., Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value (2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract id 2693231 [https://perma.cc/Y9GX-7HQN]; and Leo
E. Strine, Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological
Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014).
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governance arrangements that insulate management, it is important to be aware
of additional forms of these measures in order to limit their use. If one accepts
the positive view of these governance arrangements, understanding GADs is
important because they may have certain advantages relative to traditional
antitakeover devices from the perspective of target firms.
Second, the analysis presented in this Article does not suggest that GADs
are always the primary motivation behind a decision to engage in global activity
or to access a foreign exchange. Sometimes this decision will be motivated by
tax, financial, or other reasons. In these cases, GADs would just be a side effect
of that primary motivation. On other occasions, managers of target companies
may consider GADs to be a primary or secondary motivation when deciding to
engage in global activity. The most important point, however, is that once a
decision to cross-list or incorporate in a foreign jurisdiction is made, for any
reason, the additional antitakeover effect will be achieved.
Third, it could be argued that GADs impose significant costs not only on a
bidder, but also on a target and thus prevent a target from utilizing GADs in the
first place. We do not share this view. Certain targets may already have an office
in a foreign jurisdiction, so shifting its location will be relatively cheap for them.
Some targets may have other reasons for cross-listing, such as enhancing
liquidity and presence in foreign capital markets that in aggregate could
outweigh the potential costs of cross-listing. Finally, a target has the advantage
of making the first move and deciding in which jurisdiction it will re-incorporate
or cross-list. As a first mover, the target could choose an exchange in which it
has a comparative advantage vis-A-vis potential acquirers in terms of its ability
to comply with foreign law or due to strong financial connections.
It is also unlikely that an acquirer avoids the costs and uncertainty
associated with a hostile offer to a dual-listed target by making an all-cash offer
that does not require a prospectus. When it comes to the takeover of large public
companies, it is generally implausible that an acquirer would have the necessary
liquidity to make an all-cash offer. Furthermore, payment in stock provides
significant tax advantages to target shareholders, increasing the likelihood that
such offers are accepted. And in case the market overvalues an acquirer's stock,
it provides the latter with an opportunity to take advantage of it, using its stock
as merger consideration. All of these reasons lead to the conclusion that GADs
represent a real, and not only a theoretical, concern.
The analysis of this Article is organized as follows. Part I presents the two
central means of creating GADs and explains how they operate and what costs
and concerns they are expected to generate. It also underscores the unique
features of GADs, compared to traditional antitakeover devices such as poison
pills and staggered boards. Part II contextualizes our analysis within the broader
theoretical literature regarding cross-listing. Part III demonstrates the economic
significance of GADs. By presenting data on the growing activity of cross-listing
and global M&A activity, this Part shows that GADs are more prevalent in the
U.S. market than initially presumed. It then demonstrates that the impact of
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GADs could extend beyond the corporate control market by providing target
firms with increased insulation from activist interventions by hedge funds.
Finally, Part IV addresses the implications that stem from our analysis. We
examine the potential implications of GADs on regulatory competition among
exchanges and suggest a number of tools for mitigating the antitakeover and anti-
activist protections generated by GADs.
I. The Rise of Global Antitakeover Devices ("GADs")
A. The Mechanisms of GADs
Various forms of global activity can be utilized as GADs. Below we present
two major mechanisms: cross-listing in a foreign exchange and corporate
inversions. Both mechanisms can impose significant costs on actors who might
attempt to take over a target firm.
1. Cross-Listing on a Foreign Exchange
Cross-listing of shares occurs when a firm lists its equity shares on one or
more foreign stock exchanges in addition to its domestic exchange. By cross-
listing its stock on an additional exchange, a firm incorporated in one jurisdiction
can more easily tap into the capital market associated with a foreign exchange.
Cross-listing, especially on a large and liquid exchange, has traditionally been
motivated by a number of economic concerns, including the desire of a foreign
firm to increase its liquidity, reduce its cost of capital, expand its potential
shareholder base, and enhance its visibility in foreign markets.34 The cross-
listing is expected to increase the volume and frequency of stock trades; greater
liquidity, in turn, increases the firm's value.35
Even though a decision to cross-list on a foreign exchange could be
motivated by purely economic reasons, the core argument presented in this
Article is that such cross-listing has an additional, hidden effect: it could also
serve as a mechanism that provides insiders with some insulation from hostile
takeovers. The economic logic of our argument is that cross-listing imposes
some set of additional costs on potential acquirers that pursue dual-listed targets,
and these additional costs may deter accretive acquisitions.
34. For a review of the economic reasons for cross-listing, see Amir N. Licht, Cross-
Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 141, 143-45 (2003). For
analysis of the impact of cross-listing on firm's liquidity, see Gordon J. Alexander, Cheol S. Eun & S.
Janakiramanan, Asset Pricing and Dual Listing on Foreign Capital Markets: A Note, 42 J. FIN. 151, 151
(1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1779 (2002); Robert C.
Merton, A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information, 42 J. FIN. 483, 485
(1987).
35. See Licht, supra note 34, at 143.
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Consider a hostile bidder who is interested in taking over a target that is
cross-listed in both domestic and foreign jurisdictions. Also, as is often the case
in large takeovers, the hostile bidder's offer consists of both cash and stock.36
However, the inclusion of a stock component in the merger offer complicates a
takeover where the target is cross-listed. In particular, it forces a hostile bidder
to choose between two undesirable options: (i) proceeding with the offer without
soliciting consent from the public shareholders in the foreign jurisdiction, if the
law of the applicable jurisdiction permits it, 37 or (ii) launching a tender offer in
two different jurisdictions.
The first option, launching a tender offer in the domestic jurisdiction only,
dramatically reduces the likelihood of a successful merger, by raising the
percentage of votes needed to secure a takeover. Assume that 85% of a target's
shares are traded in the domestic jurisdiction, and the rest are traded in the
foreign exchange. In order to receive majority support for the bid, a hostile bidder
needs to attract the support of approximately 59% of all domestic shareholders
(50.1/85).38 Considering retail investors' tendency to avoid voting due to rational
apathy, this could be an extremely difficult task.39 Moreover, a bidder that
excludes the foreign shareholders of the target may not be able to consummate
the transaction using a short-form merger.40
36. For instance, 38% of mergers involving public U.S. targets announced uring the
12-month period ending in November 2016 and valued at $100 million or more were stock-only deals or
deals that involved some combination of cash and stock. See M&A AT A GLANCE, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP (Dec. 2016),
https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3848357/16decl6maag.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG2Q-G97H].
37. Many jurisdictions adopt "all-holders rules" that generally require that all offers be
extended to all holders of securities of the same class. See Federico M. Mucciarelli, Exclusion of US-
Holders in Cross-Border Takeover Bids and the Principle of Equality in Tender Offers (CEFIN Working
Paper, 2009), http://ssr.com/abstract=1399496 [https://perma.cc/W6Q8-62D9]. The United States, for
example, has adopted such a rule in Rule 14d-10(a)(1) pursuant to the Exchange Act. However, if the
number of shareholders in an additional jurisdiction is small and unnecessary to the success of the offer,
certain jurisdictions allow a hostile bidder to exclude residents of a foreign country from the offer, subject
to certain terms. For a detailed description of the exclusionary rules in the United States, see CROSS-
BORDER BUSINESS COMBINATION TRANSACTIONS, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP (Oct. 15, 2008),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC Publication Cross Border Business Combination
Transactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/29S2-ZDSF]. Such exclusionary offers are common in the United
States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan, Australia, and Canada. See Mucciarelli, supra note 37, at
8-13. Note that a bidder can exclude shareholders of foreign jurisdictions only if both the jurisdiction in
which the target incorporates and the jurisdiction in which the foreign shareholders reside permit it. This
dual requirement reduces the likelihood of an exclusion. See id.
38. The public float after excluding the foreign exchange is 85%. Since the bidder has
to receive at least 50.100 of the votes in order to proceed with the hostile bid, it will need the support of
approximately 59% of U.S. shareholders (50.1/85).
39. See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the "'Absent" Shareholders: A New
Solution to Retail Investors'Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 61-64 (2016) (showing that in 2014, 24% of
the shares in the S&P 500 were not voted).
40. For example, in most states in the United States, the support threshold for tender
offers is 90% of the remaining shareholders. That was the law in Delaware until 2013, when a legal reform
reduced the threshold to 50%o. See Audra L. Boone, Brian J. Broughman & Antonio J. Macias, Shareholder
Decision Rights in Acquisitions: Evidence from Tender Offers 1-2 (Ind. Legal Studies Research Paper No.
331, 2016), https://papers.ssr.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2629424 [https://perma.cc/Q8TU-
BGYY].
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The second option, launching two tender offers in two separate
jurisdictions, increases the chance of a successful merger but entails high
transaction costs. This option forces the hostile bidder to engage in a public
offering of the bidder's stock in a foreign jurisdiction, with all the legal and
financial consequences of such an offering. Complying with the foreign
exchange's regulatory requirements often involves significant costs for the
acquiring company. These costs can be broken into the following elements:
(i) The Direct Costs of Forcing a Foreign Public Offering. There are direct
costs of preparing and filing a prospectus for the tender offer to foreign
shareholders. These costs also include fees to domestic legal counsel, investment
bankers, and accounting professionals. If the bidder becomes cross-listed on the
foreign exchange, as Mylan did, it will also have to bear the listing fee and other
related fees.4'
(ii) Time and Opportunity Costs. The requirement to prepare and file a
prospectus in a foreign jurisdiction before completing the takeover delays the
merger process. This is a significant cost for the bidder, as time is a crucial
element for the success of a takeover offer. Any delay in the hostile tender offer
due to the requirement to prepare and file an additional prospectus or to become
listed in the foreign jurisdiction considerably disadvantages the bidder.
42
(iii) Uncertainty Costs and Litigation Risks. Exposure to foreign law may
generate significant uncertainty on the bidder's side. The bidder and its legal
counsel are unlikely to be familiar with the foreign law requirements and will
have to hire local counsel. Additionally, the bidder may face a risk of
adjudication in foreign courts, as was the case with Mylan.43 When this happens,
41. In most OECD stock exchanges, there are two central fees for listed firms: a one-
time registration fee, for which the average cap in OECD exchanges is $99,240, and an annual listing fee,
for which the average cap is $64,000. Adi Libson, The Impact of Directors' Conflict-Of-Interest on
Passive Behavior: Evidence from Directors Representing Banks on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Registration and listing fees, however, are only a fraction
of the bidder's costs. Even though there is no official figure or even estimation regarding the expenses
Mylan incurred for its bid, Perrigo spent over $100 million to fend off Mylan's offer, and one would
expect them to be roughly similar. Mark Sanchez, Perrigo Spent $1 OOM to Fight Off Mylan 's Hostile
Takeover, MIBIZ (Mar. 6, 2016, 2:49 PM), https://mibiz.com/item/23406-perrigo-spent-
[https://perma.cc/HA3Y-66VB]. Additional expenses include fees to domestic legal counsel, investment
bankers, and accounting professionals. As the BHP Billiton case demonstrates, due to the complexity of
launching a bid against a cross listed company, the bidder's law firm had more than thirty lawyers working
on the project at any one time. See infra note 11. While it is difficult to isolate the expenses related to the
bid in the foreign jurisdiction from the overall expenses on consulting and banking services, these
additional are expected to be significant. For example, as the high-profile hostile takeover attempt of
AstraZeneca by Pfizer demonstrates, Pfizer's overall costs for banking consulting services alone were
estimated between $14 million and $18 million. See Denise Roland, Pfizer and AstraZeneca to Reveal
Cost of Takeover Battle, TELEGRAPH (July 26, 2014, 4:06 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/pharmaceuticalsandchemicals/10992588/Pfizer-and-
AstraZeneca-to-reveal-cost-of-takeover-battle.html [https://perma.cc/W46S-2XWB].
42. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 890-91
(2002) (providing evidence of the positive effect of the delay of a hostile bid on the chances that a target
firm remains independent).
43. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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the bidder is likely to encounter difficulties in effectively assessing ex ante the
chances of winning or losing in a foreign forum, which may well be more
difficult to predict than the chances of winning in Delaware courts. An increase
in the uncertainty of the hostile bid's success chances through the bidder's
exposure to the potential litigation risk in foreign courts may deter the bidder
from executing a bid in the first place.
(iv) Disclosure Standards Imposed by the Foreign Exchange. Certain
foreign exchanges may impose stricter mandatory disclosure standards for any
public offering conducted on the exchange, and as such subject the hostile bid to
these enhanced disclosure requirements. If a foreign jurisdiction has more robust
disclosure requirements than the ones that exist in the domestic exchange, then
the bidder also loses the value of the otherwise private information that must be
disclosed. Consider, for instance, the disclosure rule regarding the accumulation
of ownership interest in a target firm. According to the rule enacted in the United
States, the bidder must disclose this information ten days after it passes the five
percent threshold.44 Other jurisdictions have adopted lower ownership thresholds
or shorter windows for the reporting requirements which would cause the bidder
to disclose this information faster than under U.S. regulations.4 5
(v) Complying with Other Regulatory Standards Imposed by the Foreign
Exchange. The foreign exchange may impose certain regulatory requirements on
dual-listed firms even though these firms are not incorporated or domiciled in
the foreign jurisdiction. By registering securities with the foreign exchange, the
foreign bidder becomes subject to these other corporate governance,
certification, and internal controls requirements of the foreign exchange.46 An
exchange could also include restrictions on takeover activity, and the bidder of a
dual-listed target would have to comply, unless exempted, with these rules. For
example, certain exchanges strictly prohibit the listing of a firm with
antitakeover provisions in its charter or bylaws, such as staggered boards or
poison pill provisions.4 Others, such as the TASE and, until recently, the Hong
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2018) (requiring beneficial
owners of more than five percent of the voting class of a registered company's equity to file a Schedule
13D, reporting acquisition and other information such as identity and background of acquirer and purpose
of purchase, within ten days).
45. Several foreign jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and
Hong Kong, require blockholders to disclose lower stakes or to disclose stakes more quickly than current
U.S. rules. See Lucian Bebchuk & Robert Jackson, The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure,
2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 40, 57-58 (2012).
46. For example, by registering securities with the SEC, a non-American bidder
becomes subject to corporate governance, certification, internal controls, and disclosure requirements
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Mergers andAcquisitions 2016, INT'L COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDES
(Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/mergers-and-acquisitions/mergers-and-acquisitions-
2016/usa [https://perma.cc/W79Y-LM8L].
47. EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED FOREIGN ANTITAKEOVER REGIMES, KIRKLAND &
ELLIS LLP 1 (2015), https://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/MAUpdate 072815.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YL3Y-M94H] (noting the prohibition on the adoption of poison pills in Ireland and the
United Kingdom); Carsten Gerner Beurle et al., Is the Board Neutrality Rule Trivial? Amnesia About
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Kong Stock Exchange, strictly prohibit the listing of firms with a dual-class stock
structure, and hostile bidders with such structures will not be permitted to list its
shares on these exchanges.48 Ironically, a target's decision to relocate its
corporate domicile to a jurisdiction that prohibits the use of antitakeover devices
provides the target with a strong defense against potential acquirers that include
these antitakeover devices in their organizational documents.
2. Foreign Incorporations and Inversions
Corporate inversions occur when corporations relocate their legal domicile,
typically through a merger or acquisition of a foreign firm, to another
jurisdiction.49 Many inversions are motivated by the tax benefits of shifting a
firm's income to a low-tax jurisdiction such as Ireland or the Netherlands and
thereby avoiding the American tax regime in favor of foreign tax treatment.50
The relatively low barriers to shifting the incorporation of a company to a foreign
country have made tax inversions a viable option,51 and tax scholars have
suggested various solutions to disincentivize them.52
A corporation could also be organized in a foreign jurisdiction but list its
shares on a U.S. exchange. A recent example of a company taking this approach
is Spotify, the music streaming services company. Spotify is headquartered in
Sweden and incorporated in Luxembourg. In April 2018, the company went
public through a direct listing of its shares on the New York Stock Exchange.53
The final result in this case is similar to the one achieved by a corporate
inversion: a foreign company that is traded on a U.S. stock exchange.
Corporate Law in European Takeover Regulation, 22 EUROPEAN BUS. L. REV. 559, 581-82 (2011)
(referring to the British prohibition on adopting a staggered board).
48. See Securities Law, supra note 18; Jennifer Hughes & Josh Noble, Hong Kong
Exchange Gives Up on Dual-Class Share Plan, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/0bc597ee-6b42-1 le5-aca9-d87542bf8673 [https://perma.cc/9WP5-3M2C].
49. See Talley, supra note 2, at 1650-5 1.
50. Id. ("In a typical inversion, a U.S. multinational corporation ('MNC') merges with
a foreign company. The entity that ultimately emerges from this transactional cocoon is invariably
incorporated abroad, yet typically remains li ted in U.S. securities markets .... [C]orporate inversions
permit domestic MNCs eventually to replace U.S. with foreign tax treatment of their extraterritorial
earnings ....").
51. 26 U.S.C. § 951 (2018). This form of separation is possible only in a "personal" tax
system such as the United States, in which tax is levied according to the nationality of the entity taxing
the worldwide income of a U.S. entity, whether a person or corporation.
52. Some suggested reforming the U.S. tax system altogether and moving it to a
territorial rather than personal system. See Mihir A. Desai, A Better Way to Tax U.S. Businesses, HARV.
Bus. REV. (July-Aug. 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/07/a-better-way-to-tax-us-businesses
[https://perma.cc/2QV2-8ZB9]; see also Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014, S. 2360, 113th Cong.
(2014). Others have recommended lowering the U.S. corporate tax rate. See, e.g., Eric Toder & Alan
Viard, Replacing Corporate Tax Revenues with a Mark to Market Tax on Shareholder Income, 69 NAT'L
TAX J. 701 (2016) (advocating a zero percent corporate tax rate). A third group has focused on global
mechanisms such as tax treaties to overcome the problem of the "race to the bottom." See, e.g., Steven A.
Bank, The Globalization of Corporate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1307 (2013).
53. Spotify Technology S.A., Form F-i, 51, 148 (Mar. 23, 2018).
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The most important point for our purposes is that the legal consequences of
a relocation of a U.S. firm to a foreign jurisdiction extend well beyond tax law
and also implicate corporate and securities law. A foreign company, although
listed on a U.S. exchange, is still subject to the corporate law of its jurisdiction
of incorporation and must comply with that jurisdiction's takeover regulation,
which may function as a significant bar to takeovers.
A prominent example is the stichting mechanism used in the Netherlands,
which provides firms that decide to re-incorporate in that country with a
powerful protection against hostile bids. 4 A stichting, which means
"foundation" in Dutch, does not have any legal owners, and its only governing
body prescribed by law is a board of independent trustees, authorized to act with
a broad statement of purpose, including the preservation of the mission of the
target company.5 A Dutch company can grant a call option to a stichting to
acquire a sufficient amount of preferred stock to exercise voting control over that
company. The stichting is then entitled, in its sole discretion, to exercise these
options to take voting control over the company, at least temporarily, if the
foundation determines it is in the best interest of that company and necessary to
maintain the status quo or preserve the mission of the target company.6 With the
ability to acquire approximately fifty percent of the voting power of the target at
any time, the stichting is able to block both an unsolicited takeover bid and
attempts by an activist to replace members of the board.
Furthermore, the foreign law regulating takeovers may also include other
restrictions, such as requiring a supermajority for a hostile bid to be accepted.58
Foreign law could also deprive some other rights from shareholders, such as the
right to file class action or derivative lawsuits.5 9
54. Shayndi Raice & Margot Patrick, The Rise of the 'Stichting, 'an Obscure Takeover
Defense, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2015, 12:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rise-of-the-stichting-
an-obscure-takeover-defense-1429716204 [https://perma.cc/8U34-7375] ("More than 125,000 stichtings
are registered in the Netherlands .... Their creators hail from Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere ....
55. Id.
56. See Leonard Chazen & Peter Werdmuller, The Dutch Poison Pill: How Is It
Different from an American Rights Plan?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec.
1, 2015), https:Hcorpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/01/the-dutch-poison-pill-how-is-it-different-from-an-
american-rights-plan [https:Hperma.cc/P7ML-GMTS]; Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Unintended Twist
of Tax Inversions, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 24, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/25/business/dealbook/the-unintended-twist-of-tax-inversions.html
[https://perma.cc/P3XX-WW6V].
57. See Raice & Patrick, supra note 55; see also Daniel E. Wolf, Foreign Antitakeover
Regimes, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 18, 2015),
https:Hcorpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/08/18/foreign-antitakeover-regimes [https://perma.cc/58Z5-
R4DP] ("[T]argets could try to drop 'crown jewel' assets into the foundation, seeking to put those assets
beyond the control of the bidder even if it succeeds, or outside its reach to facilitate required antitrust
divestitures.").
58. See supra note 38-40 and accompanying text.
59. For example, under Luxembourg law, the board of directors has sole authority to
decide whether to initiate legal action to enforce a company's rights. See supra note 53, at 172, for the list
of the main attributes of Luxemburg law that investors should be aware of.
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In sum, foreign incorporations and inversions force the hostile bidder to
comply with the corporate law of the foreign jurisdiction, with all the legal and
financial consequences that entails. When the foreign law includes certain
limitations on takeover activity or shareholders' ability to exercise some of their
basic rights, complying with the foreign law involves substantial costs for the
acquiring company and may function as a significant bar to takeovers.
Compliance with foreign law also imposes uncertainty costs and litigation risks,
as well as the time delay and opportunity costs discussed in the previous
Subsection.
B. The Economic Effect of GADs
The previous Section revealed the main mechanisms that create GADs:
cross-listing and incorporation in a foreign jurisdiction. It also showed that these
two GAD mechanisms impose a set of costs on potential acquirers that pursue
targets that have adopted them. These additional costs include the direct costs of
forcing foreign public offering, the time delay and loss of opportunity costs,
increased uncertainty and litigation risks, and the need to comply with the
corporate law and listing standards of a foreign exchange or jurisdiction. When
these costs, in the aggregate, are significant they could deter bidders from
attempting to take over the dual-listed target in the first place. Since the costs of
financing and preparing a hostile takeover could be extremely high, a bidder,
who must incur a large fraction of these costs even if the takeover does not
materialize, might be less willing to launch a hostile bid against a target with a
GAD.60
These costs, however, have to be weighed against the potential value of an
acquisition to the bidder after deducting all previous costs associated with the
hostile bid. Where the new costs imposed by a GAD outweigh the value of the
acquisition (or cast the deal into such doubt that its expected value could fall to
near zero), the bid will be dropped. In that case, the costs of the GAD would
discourage potential takeover activity, even if it increases share value, and thus
serve as an effective defensive measure.
By way of illustration, assume that at time To, an executive of a U.S.
publicly traded firm considers two investment opportunities: (i) a merger with
another U.S. company and (ii) a merger with a company that is traded on a
foreign exchange. Each of the two investment has different advantages and
60. Oracle spent $60 million on its hostile takeover bid for Peoplesoft. Oracle's
Peoplesoft Takeover Bid Can Go Ahead, Judge Rules, RED HAT DEVELOPER'S J. (Sept. 10, 2004, 12:00
AM), http://redhat.sys-con.com/node/46287 [https://perma.cc/K6B2-C2LD]. On the flipside, Perrigo
spent over $100 million to fend offMylan's offer. See Sanchez, supra note 41. SABMiller incurred costs
of $160 million in fending off Anheuser-Busch's offer, which was eventually accepted. Ben Martin,
SABMiller Spends £l1m Defending Against AB Inbev and Keeping Hold of Staff TELEGRAPH (May 18,
2016, 12:05 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/05/18/sabmiller-profits-fall-as-costs-in-
africa-mount-ahead-of-abinbev [https://perma.cc/YBM8-WRBC]. While the bidder's costs were not
reported in the two last cases, they are expected to be similar, if not even higher.
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disadvantages. For instance, a merger with a foreign firm could be more
complex, but it has tax advantages. It also increases the presence of the U.S. firm
in an emerging foreign market and provides the CEO with additional insulation
from potential hostile bidders due to the factors discussed in the previous
Section. Taking all considerations into account, the CEO chooses to merge the
61U.S. company with the foreign entity.
At Ti, a hostile bidder, who is interested in taking over the dual-listed target,
emerges. The target has 10,000,000 shares, and to complete the bid, the bidder
has to make an offer that would be accepted by the holders of a majority of the
target's outstanding stock (5,000,001). The current stock price of the target is
$100 per share and is traded on NASDAQ and on another foreign exchange. The
bidder is willing to purchase the target stock for $105 per share (including all
estimated expenses related to the merger) but would walk away if the purchase
price is higher as the merger would no longer be profitable to the bidder. The
directors of the target object to the takeover, claiming that when the target's long-
run projects come to fruition, the value of the stock will be significantly higher.
Since the target is cross-listed on a foreign stock exchange, the bidder has
to file a prospectus or become listed on the foreign exchange in order to proceed
with the offer. This will require the bidder to incur all of the additional costs
mentioned above that accompany the bidding process, including the time delay
and loss of opportunity costs, increased uncertainty and litigation risks, and the
need to comply with the corporate law and listing standards of a foreign
exchange or jurisdiction.
If the additional costs imposed by the GAD exceeds $50 million, then the
GAD would discourage the hostile bid. This is because the GAD would increase
the cost per share of the takeover by at least an additional five dollars, increasing
the overall costs of the bid to $105 or more and thus making it an unprofitable
proposition for the bidder.62
To be clear, the above analysis does not suggest that GADs will provide
targets with absolute insulation from hostile takeovers. When the potential
benefits that a bidder is likely to derive from a hostile acquisition of a foreign or
cross-listed firm outweigh the additional costs imposed by GADs, then the
bidder is likely to proceed with the hostile offer. Our analysis, however, does
suggest hat GADs impose some transaction costs on potential acquirers that may
deter accretive acquisitions.
61. A target may encounter a liquidity issue when implementing this defensive strategy
and listing its stock on a foreign exchange. If the target firm is a large public company and the foreign
exchange is relatively small in comparison to the U.S. exchanges, it will be hard for that foreign exchange
to absorb all the stocks of the target, and the stock listed on the foreign exchange will be relatively illiquid.
However, the target does not have to list all of its stock on a small, foreign exchange. As the Mylan
example demonstrates, shifting as little as ten percent of the share float to a foreign jurisdiction could
effectively prevent the bidder from obtaining a majority approval of the shareholders whose shares are
traded on the U.S. exchange alone.
62. See supra, notes 41-60 and accompanying text. For examples of similar or even
higher total estimated costs of global hostile mergers, see supra note 60.
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Corporate law scholarship has long emphasized the strong interests
managers have in adopting antitakeover mechanisms that insulate them from
external monitoring pressures.63 If one accepts that view, then there is a good
basis to believe that managerial decisions regarding global corporate activity
may also be motivated by corporate governance effects and incentives to insulate
the firm from market forces.64 But even if one assumes that GADs are never the
main motivation behind a decision to engage in global activity (a very strong
assumption), that does not change our core analysis. Once a decision to engage
in cross-listing or inversions is made for whatever reason, the antitakeover effect
of GADs will be achieved.
C. Are GADs of More Than Theoretical Concern?
In this Section, we address two potential critiques that question the ability
of targets to use GADs as an antitakeover device. In particular, these critiques
suggest hat GADs could impose significant costs not only on a bidder, but also
on a target, and thus prevent a target from utilizing it in the first place (Subsection
II.C. 1), and that GADs can easily be circumvented if the hostile bidder make an
all-cash offer (Subsection II.C.2). We conclude that these critiques do not, either
individually or collectively, provide a good basis for viewing GADs as a merely
theoretical concern.
1. The Costs of GADs to Targets
While the mechanism underlying GADs imposes significant costs on a
bidder who is interested in acquiring a target, it could also impose high costs on
a potential target utilizing a GAD. This raises the question of whether the costs
of GADs might prevent a target from utilizing it in the first place.
Targets will still have sufficient motivation to utilize GADs for a number
of reasons. First, a target may already have an office in a foreign jurisdiction, so
shifting its location will be relatively cheap.
Second, the use of GADs could be codetermined by other motivations for
cross-listing for inversion. For example, motivations to shift the location of their
63. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 42, at 900-39 (providing
theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of effectiveness of staggered boards as an antitakeover tool);
Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Defensive Tactics and Optimal Search: A Simulation Approach (Yale
L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 552, 2016), https:Hssrn.com/abstract 2805529 [https:Hperma.ccVM9Y-
XYSR] (providing preliminary evidence that defensive tactics "are unequivocally bad for acquirers; good
for target shareholders at some levels, but not at higher levels; and can materially reduce efficiency in the
market for corporate control"); see also Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Case Against Staggered Boards,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:43 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/the-case-against-
staggered-boards [https://perma.cc/YB57-PSBH] (noting that "[a]cademics argue that the staggered board
thus serves as a powerful antitakeover device and 'entrenches' the board" and surveying related literature).
64. This may also spur competition between jurisdictions based on the antitakeover
framework they provide. For further discussion regarding the effect of GADs on competition between
exchanges, see infra Section IV.A.
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incorporation include tax, antitrust, and IP considerations. Target firms also have
financial reasons for cross-listing, such as enhancing liquidity and presence in
foreign capital markets. If these other motivations to engage in global activity
are strong enough, a target that chooses to cross-list or shift its place of
incorporation will also receive some protections through a GAD. Collectively,
these benefits will often be sufficient for firms to adopt GADs.
Third, a target utilizing a GAD has the advantage of making the first move
and deciding in which jurisdiction it should reincorporate or on which exchange
it should list. The first mover has various options for GADs jurisdictions and
exchanges with various protections, disclosure requirements, accounting
restrictions, board membership restrictions, and restrictions on antitakeover
provisions and capital structure. A potential target could choose the exchange on
which it has a comparative advantage the one with the lowest compliance costs
for the target but with higher compliance costs for a potential acquirer.
For instance, a target may already have a strong presence in a foreign
jurisdiction, while its potential acquirers do not. A target with a single share class
structure could also cross-list on an exchange that prohibits the use of unequal
voting rights, thus deterring potential acquirers with dual-class capital structure.
A target with many independent directors could list on an exchange that requires
a certain portion of the board to qualify as independent directors, which would
deter potential acquirers who do not have enough independent directors on the
board. Therefore, the use of GADs does not necessarily entail the same costs for
a target and potential acquirer.
2. Circumventing GADs by Cash Offers?
Even if one accepts the significance of GADs as an antitakeover
mechanism, one may still wonder whether it could easily be circumvented. One
possible way to reduce the hefty costs and significant uncertainty associated with
a hostile offer to a dual-listed target would be to make an all-cash offer. An offer
that does not contain a stock element would not be treated as a public offering
and thus would not require the acquirer to create a prospectus and to fulfill other
requirements of the foreign exchange.
Yet acquirers of large public companies often do not have the necessary
liquidity to make an all-cash offer.65 Moreover, one of the central driving forces
behind many takeovers is the market's misevaluation of the acquirer's stock:
when the market overvalues an acquirer's stock, the acquirer can take advantage
of this by using its stock as merger consideration.66 An acquirer with many
investment opportunities might also try to avoid the risky debt required to
65. See M&A at a Glance, supra note 36 (stating that 
4
0% of all deals include an in-
kind component).
66. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN.
ECON. 295, 309 (2003).
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finance a cash-based takeover. Such debt could decrease the willingness of its
management to undertake additional investments.6' Furthermore, payment by
stock provides significant ax advantages to the target's shareholders, increasing
the likelihood that offers are accepted.68
At least in theory, an acquirer could also propose a more complex offer that
includes cash-plus-stock consideration for shares sold to the acquirer on one
exchange, and solely cash consideration for stocks sold on the more restrictive
exchange. That way, an acquirer can circumvent the disclosure and other
regulatory requirements in the foreign exchange by limiting the offer in that
jurisdiction to cash while overcoming its liquidity constraints through stock
consideration in the main exchange, where most of the target stocks will be held.
This type of offer, however, may raise legal concerns as it discriminates
between holders of the same stock with the same cash flow rights by providing
them with differential consideration. U.S. law, for instance, allows a bidder to
offer securities to tendering target holders in foreign jurisdictions and to offer
cash to tendering U.S. holders through an arrangement known as "vendor
placement," as long as the target company is a foreign private issuer and U.S.
security holders hold ten percent or less of the class of securities sought in the
offer.69 However, if the percentage of U.S. security holders is higher than ten
percent, then vendor placement arrangements are generally subject to Securities
Act registration unless exempted by the SEC.70 Also, even if under U.S. law it
would be possible to launch an offer with differentiated consideration, there is a
high likelihood that foreign exchanges would not permit such an offer.
71
Moreover, even if the use of differential consideration would be legally
valid, it would not necessarily circumvent a GAD. If shareholders in the central
67. Kenneth J. Martin, The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions, Investment
Opportunities and Management Ownership, 51 J. FIN. 1227 (1996). Martin uses Tobin's Q as a proxy for
firms' investment opportunities a higher Tobin's Q reflects that the firm has greater investment
opportunities. See id. at 1230. A positive correlation exists between Tobin's Q and the propensity of
acquiring firms to pay in stock. See id. at 1243-44.
68. Alan J. Auerbach & David Reishus, The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and
Acquisitions, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 69, 71-77 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1987). Even though the
tax benefit is apparently for the shareholders of the target firm, whose immediate tax liability is lower
when compensation is through stock, the acquiring firm may also gain from the tax benefit. As the tax
benefit for the recipients is higher, they can adjust compensation downward. How the tax benefit is divided
between the acquirer and the target's shareholders depends on the incidence of the tax benefit. Regarding
the concept of tax incidence and how the party that receives a tax benefit is not necessarily the party that
gains from the tax benefit, see D. Fulleron & G.E. Mecalf, Tax Incidence, in 4 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 1787 (2002).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(c)(1) (2018).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(c)(2) (2018). See also Cross-Border Business Combination
Transactions, supra note 37, at 26-27 (also noting that an exemption will be granted only if "the market
for the bidder securities that would be to be issued in the exchange offer and sold pursuant to the vendor
placement is highly liquid and robust and the number of bidder securities to be issued for the benefit of
tendering U.S. holders is relatively small compared to the total number of bidder securities outstanding").
71. See Mucciarelli, supra note 37, at 13-15 (explaining that pursuant to article 3 of the
EU Takeover Directive, Member States cannot derogate the general principle of equality among holders
of the same class of securities).
Vol. 36, 2019
Global Antitakeover Devices
exchange prefer cash over stock consideration, they could try to shift the listing
of their stock from one exchange to the other. 2 Thus, an acquirer is unlikely to
solve its liquidity constraint by making an offer with differential consideration
to shareholders in different exchanges.
D. The Unique Features of GADs
Finally, in order to determine the significance of GADs as a defensive
measure, we must clarify the circumstances of its use relative to traditional
antitakeover measures, such as poison pills and staggered boards. In this Section,
we explore the unique features of cross-listing as a defensive measure in contrast
to the other conventional defensive measures.
1. Lack of Transparency
One of the major problems any company that adopts traditional
antitakeover measures faces is the objection of public shareholders. As noted
earlier, antitakeover measures are mostly espoused by managers and directors,
and many shareholders see their enactment in a negative light, as it weakens their
power to determine whether an offer should be accepted. For that reason,
shareholder resistance is often the central impediment for the enactment of
antitakeover measures midstream. 4
A GAD created through cross-listing can circumvent shareholder
opposition. The existence of other prominent rationales for cross-listing, besides
functioning as an antitakeover mechanism, camouflages the antitakeover
function of cross-listing and reduces the chance that shareholders will rally
against it. Management could argue that cross-listing is necessary for
diversifying liquidity sources and increasing the visibility of the firm and its
products in foreign markets, downplaying its antitakeover effect. A parallel
mechanism is common when staggered boards are introduced at the same time
as a merger.75 One of the possible explanations for this phenomenon is that the
adoption of a staggered board midstream is perceived by shareholders as a "side
effect" of a large M&A deal.76 Cross-listing conceals the antitakeover measure
to an even greater extent, and this action is likely to avoid shareholder scrutiny.
72. Even if shareholders may shift the listing of the stock, differential consideration
may still be a form of discrimination. While a stock traded in exchange X can receive the compensation
offered in X without additional costs of shifting the listing of the stock, the stock traded in exchange Y
has to incur additional costs to receive the same compensation. Functionally, not all shareholders are given
offers with the same economic value.
73. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also Bebchuk, supra note 33.
74. See infra note 87 (presenting data on institutional investors' efforts to eliminate the
use of staggered boards midstream).
75. See generally Lucian Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1549 (2010).
76. Id at 1566 ("It is easier for shareholders to accept a governance choice that is built
into the deal than to accept a salary demand made by managers as a condition to the deal.").
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Even professional proxy advisory firms ignore the entrenchment impact of
cross-listing. Institutional Shareholder Services' governance index, "Quick
Score 3.0," which aims to assess a firm's takeover defenses, does not include any
reference to whether a firm has cross-listed its stock." This is also true of
academic governance indexes that assess the level of a firm's takeover defenses,
such as the "Entrenchment Index"
78 and the "G-Index."79
2. Lack of Judicial Review
The use of cross-listing as a GAD is unlikely to be exposed to the same
level of judicial scrutiny that applies to conventional defensive measures. The
GAD's defensive element is understood as a side effect of an action with an
alternative central rationale: to increase liquidity or exposure in foreign markets.
Under Delaware law, as in most jurisdictions in the United States, managerial
and board business decisions are generally immune from judicial review.
According to Delaware's business judgment rule, in order to legally question the
legitimacy of a business decision, a plaintiff has to prove that the decision was
not made on an informed basis, was not made in good faith, or was made without
an honest belief that it was in the best interests of the company.8"
However, when a poison pill is being maintained as a defensive measure, a
standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny applies.8' Faced with the "omnipresent
specter" of board entrenchment, Delaware courts have articulated an
intermediate standard of review, the "enhanced" business judgment rule.
82
According to that heightened standard of review, to justify the use of a defensive
measure and shift the burden of proof back to the plaintiffs, the board has to show
it had "reasonable grounds for believing a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed" and that the defensive tactic employed by the board was
"reasonable in proportion to the threat posed.83 By doing so, the board rebuts
77. ISS Governance Quick Score 3.0: Overview and Updates, INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER SERVICES 49-55 (2016), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/products/qs-technical-
document-april-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ4A-2TH8].
78. Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009).
79. Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and
Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107 (2003).
80. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
81. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985); see also
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011); Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund
11 v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310,335 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("[I]t is settled law that the standard of review to be employed
to address whether a poison pill is being exercised consistently with a board's fiduciary duties is ...
Unocal ... ").




the presumption that the decision to adopt antitakeover measures is motivated by
self-interest.84
Unlike the adoption of a poison pill, a decision to cross-list could always
be justified by other business rationales as its main purpose, in which case the
enhanced business judgment rule does apply. For instance, the board could claim
that the primary purpose for cross-listing is to enhance liquidity, increase access
to new markets, save on taxes, and so on. Therefore, cross-listing is much less
susceptible to heightened review, especially if the decision to cross-list was not
done in the face of a hostile bid, and it is most likely to benefit from the protection
of the business judgment rule, which would shield it from judicial intervention.
This, in turn, could make it more attractive to target firms than traditional
defensive measures, such as poison pills.
85
Cross-listing, therefore, reduces the chances a target will face litigation as
a consequence of utilizing this defensive form and saves the potential costs
associated with this proceeding. Furthermore, ven if litigation takes place, there
is a greater chance that the court would reject the claim due to the likely
application of the business judgment rule.
3. Persistence
Cross-listing as a global antitakeover device is also more difficult to retract
than alternative antitakeover measures. While a poison pill can be redeemed at
any time, it is more complex and difficult to undo a firm's decision to cross-list,
which involves the foreign exchange as a third party. This is true even when
compared to another powerful antitakeover provision, the use of staggered
boards.8 6 Activist shareholders that submitted non-binding shareholder proposals
to de-stagger boards managed to reduce the number of firms with staggered
boards from 60% of the S&P 500 firms in 2001 to fewer than 20% in 2014.8
84. In Unitrin v. American General Group, the court determined that if the board cannot
prove these two points, it confirms their conflict of interest, and the more stringent entire fairness test will
apply for analyzing their decision. 651 A.2d 1361, 1377 n.18 (Del. 1995). Regarding the scope of the
Enhanced Business Judgment Rule, see Mary Siegel, The Problems and Promise of the "'Enhanced
Business Judgment Rule, " 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 47 (2014).
85. While in the recent Airgas case, the Delaware court upheld the board's maintenance
of the company's poison pill in the face of an unfriendly cash tender offer that he board determined was
inadequate, the decision did not validate the ability of boards to "just say never." The board's
determination is still subject to judicial review under an enhanced scrutiny standard without the deference
afforded by the business judgment rule. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 54
(Del. Ch. 2011). In that case, the Airgas board was able to meet this higher standard, but another board
might not. Therefore, targets are more likely to prefer an antitakeover device that does not automatically
trigger the enhanced standard of review.
86. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 63 (claiming that there was not even one case
between 1996 and 2000 of a hostile bidder taking over a company with a staggered board provision).
87. R.J. Guo, Timothy A. Kruse & Tom Nohel, Activism and the Shift to Annual
Director Elections, 14 J. ACCT. & FIN. 83, 83 (2014). Just between 2011 and 2014, the Shareholder Rights
Project (SRP), a clinical program directed by Professor Lucian Bebchuk, assisted institutional investors
in bringing about declassification at roughly one hundred S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies. For a
review of the work done by the SRP, see Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Towards the
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This illustrates that even the most stringent traditional antitakeover provision can
be lifted by the engagement of shareholders.
Even if shareholders adopt a resolution that forces the board of a target firm
to delist the stock from a foreign exchange or change the country of
incorporation, in many cases this material change may have significant financial
ramifications on the company. These could include reduced liquidity and
diversification, or the need to relocate the corporate headquarters and hire new
workers in the case of a change in the corporate residency.88 These ramifications
come with high costs. Additionally, the tax law implications may also complicate
the decision to shift the location of incorporation. Even if the original inversion
of the firm was solely based on regulatory considerations and not on tax arbitrage
considerations, the reincorporation of the firm may have significant adverse tax
consequences. The inversion may be treated as realization of income for the firm,
generating a tax liability.89
For all of the above reasons, the process of eliminating a GAD might be
complex and costly due to the inherent involvement of third parties (the
exchange and foreign regulators) and the broad financial and legal implications
of that decision.
II. Locating GADs in the Wider Theoretical Context
The analytical framework we introduce in this Article also makes a
contribution to the growing literature on cross-listing. In this Part, we present the
major hypotheses raised in the literature as to why firms choose to cross-list their
stock on a foreign exchange. We then aim to expand the cross-listing taxonomy
by presenting our "insulation hypothesis" and by locating it in the wider
theoretical context.
The first theories on cross-listing, arising in the early 1990s, focus on the
business motivations of foreign firms to cross-list on a large exchange, such as
one of the U.S. or U.K. exchanges.90 These business motivations included the
willingness to increase the liquidity of the firm's stock, reduce the firm's costs
of raising capital, expand its potential shareholder base, and enhance its visibility
in various markets.9' Cross-listing on a large and liquid exchange increases the
Declassification of S&P 500 Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157 (2013). Additional information on
successful precatory proposals can be found at the Shareholder Rights Project website. Proposals Going
to a Vote, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT (2017), http://srp.law.harvard.edu/companies-voting-on-
proposals.shtml [https:Hperma.cc/NF92-TD5N].
88. This is the case for most jurisdictions other than the United States, in which
"corporate residency" is defined by the location of "central management and control" and not according
to the jurisdiction of incorporation. See ROBERT COUZIN, CORPORATE RESIDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
TAxATION 25 (2002); Talley, supra note 2, at 1661.
89. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Expectations andExpatriations: Tracing
the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 409, 421 (2002).




volume and frequency of the firm's stock trades, and greater liquidity, in turn,
will increase the firm's value.92
By the late 1990s, non-business motivations for cross-listing were
introduced, focusing on the governance motivations for cross-listing. Two main
theories that dominate this discourse are the "legal bonding" and "avoidance"
hypotheses. These theories focused mostly on explaining the conventional
phenomenon of foreign firms cross-listing in large exchanges, and in particular
the popularity of the NYSE and NASDAQ with foreign companies. They did not
attempt to explain the opposite and more recent practice of U.S. firms, or
firms from other developed countries, cross-listing on exchanges in developing
countries with relatively low liquidity or weak investor protections, such as
China or India ("reverse cross-listing").
93
Recent academic research that sheds light on the growing phenomenon
suggests that reverse cross-listing could be motivated by firms' desire to enhance
their commercial presence in the foreign market: the "commercial bonding"
hypothesis. Our "insulation hypothesis" provides an additional explanation for
both cross-listing of foreign firms on U.S. exchanges and reverse cross-listing.
As we show, these actions could also be motivated by management's desire to
insulate themselves from hostile takeovers and activist intervention.
A. The Legal Bonding Hypothesis
In a well-known article, John Coffee argues that the primary motivation for
foreign firms to cross-list their stock abroad is different from traditional
commercial explanations and is grounded in what he terms the "bonding
hypothesis." According to Coffee, by cross-listing in the United States, a foreign
firm can credibly commit to a regime of enhanced disclosure and greater
exposure in a shareholder-protective legal regime, including effective tools for
remedies such as class actions and derivative actions.94 In addition, entrance into
the U.S. market exposes the foreign issuer to the scrutiny of reputational
intermediaries, including U.S. underwriters, auditors, debt rating agencies, and
securities analysts.95 These reputational intermediaries reinforce the firm's
commitment to full disclosure.96 And this commitment mechanism, in turn,
reduces the foreign firm's cost of capital by increasing investor confidence.
Coffee supports his bonding hypothesis by showing that foreign firms with
U.S.-listed American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) receive more outside
financing than comparable foreign firms not listed in the United States and that
92. Id
93. For a description of this trend, see Nicholas Calcina Howson & Vikramaditya S.
Khanna, Reverse Cross-Listings The Coming Race to List in Emerging Markets and an Enhanced
Understanding of Classical Bonding, 47 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 607, 608-11 (2014).
94. Coffee, supra note 34, at 1780.
95. Id. at 1781.
96. Id.
Yale Journal on Regulation
subsequent equity issuances of firms from certain countries, typically emerging
economies, do not take place in the United States but rather in their origin
county.9' If the central benefit for cross-listing is access to a liquid U.S. exchange
with strong investor protections, then one would expect future stock issuances to
take place mostly in the U.S. exchange. According to Coffee, the bonding effect
can explain this phenomenon. The benefit an issuer derives from enhanced
disclosure and strong shareholder protections increases not only the demand for
its stock in the U.S. exchange but also demand in the foreign exchange.
B. The Avoidance Hypothesis
Amir Licht presents an alternative explanation for cross-listing: the
"avoidance" hypothesis.98 Licht's analysis uses a regulatory prism while
pointing to the exchange's regulatory standards as an additional motive behind
managerial decisions whether or not to cross-list.99 However, in contrast to the
bonding hypothesis, the avoidance hypothesis proposes that a decision to cross-
list in a foreign exchange and the choice of the particular destination markets are
motivated by managerial interests. Therefore, "stringent corporate governance
requirements in destination markets actually deter insiders and may drive them
to avoid cross-listing on these markets."'0 When managers opt to cross-list, they
may do so in order to decrease, rather than to enhance, corporate governance
requirements and disclosure liabilities.'0 '
Although the United States is perceived to have high regulatory standards
of disclosure for listed firms, cross-listing not only has not increased disclosure
but even have helped decrease it for these firms. 0 2 Foreign firms listed on U.S.
exchanges have to file different annual disclosure forms, which have a more
limited scope compared to the statements filed by U.S. firms.0 3 For instance,
foreign issuers are not required to disclose the individual compensation packages
97. Id. at 1791-94. See also William A. Reese Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection
of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listing in the United States and Subsequent Equity Offerings,
66 J. FIN. ECON. 65, 95-101 (2002).
98. See Licht, supra note 34; see also Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural
Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 195 (2004); Amir
N. Licht, Managerial Opportunism andForeign Listing: Some Direct Evidence, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 325 (2001); Amir N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in International
Securities Transactions, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51 (2000).
99. In Licht's view, "the dominant factors in the choice of cross-listing destination
markets are access to cheaper finance and enhancing the issuer's visibility. Corporate governance is a
second-order consideration .... Licht, supra note 34, at 142-43.
100. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins, supra note 98, at 197-98.
101. See Licht, supra note 34, at 148-49.
102. See id. at 150-54.
103. Regular U.S. firms have to complete the 10-K form annually, while foreign firms
have to complete Form 20-F. Regarding disclosure requirements of American public companies, see the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13 and 15(d), 17 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (2018). Regarding lenient
disclosure requirements of foreign companies, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3(b) (2018).
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of its top executives but only the total compensation of all executives.10 4 They
are also not required to disclose related party transactionsl' or the identities of
shareholders with over five percent of the company's equity capital.
10 6
Moreover, in some countries, dual-listed firms are exempt from certain
disclosure requirements of the foreign exchange. Thus, by cross-listing on a U.S.
exchange, these companies manage to lower the overall regulatory standards that
govern their disclosure requirements. 107
The gap between U.S. firms and foreign firms is also reflected in the level
of enforcement. While the U.S. is mostly known as a jurisdiction with aggressive
enforcement of securities law, this strict enforcement applies to U.S. firms and
not foreign firms. Indeed, until 2004, there had been no enforcement measures
taken against firms from emerging markets. 08 Moreover, private interviews with
lawyers in the field have reinforced the hypothesis that the SEC abstains from
opening enforcement measures against firms from emerging markets. 109
C. The Commercial Bonding Hypothesis
Both the legal bonding and the avoidance hypotheses focus on explaining
the traditional form of cross-listing a firm from an exchange with limited
liquidity or weak shareholder protections listing on a large exchange with strong
shareholder protections. Their theories, however, do not intuitively explain why
U.S. or U.K. firms would reverse cross-list. Reverse cross-listing in ajurisdiction
with weak corporate governance and disclosure standards might send a negative
signal to investors and is unlikely to serve as a bonding mechanism. 110 Also, as
long as a U.S. or U.K. firm remains listed on its domestic exchange, it is hard to
see how the decision to cross-list would alleviate that firm's regulatory
burden. 111
104. See FORM 20-F, SEC. & ExCANGE COMM'N (Sept. 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form20-fpdf [https://perma.cc/UM2V-B23Y].
105. Regarding lenient disclosure requirements of foreign companies, compare 17
C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3(b) (2018) with 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2018).
106. FORM 20-F, supra note 104.
107. Even though Licht illustrates his theory by focusing on the case of Israeli firms
that are listed on NASDAQ, his findings could be relevant to other foreign jurisdictions. Licht,
Managerial Opportunism, supra note 98, at 331-36. Moreover, Israel has the second-most listings on
NASDAQ outside North America, with 94 firms listed. See Companies by Region, NASDAQ (2018),
http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/regions.aspx.
108. Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S.
Securities Laws?, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 321 (2004).
109. Id.
110. See Howson & Khanna, supra note 93, at 628.
111. If a company's securities are registered under the Exchange Act (regardless of
whether the company is cross-listed on another exchange), that company must comply with detailed
disclosure requirements and the applicable exchange listing standard. See Mergers andAcquisitions 2016,
supra note 46. A U.S. firm could subject itself to different disclosure and corporate law rules by
reincorporating in a different jurisdiction, but as long as the cross-listed firm remains listed and
incorporated in the United States, it will be subject to the stringent U.S. disclosure requirements.
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Recently, Nicholas Howson and Vikramaditya Khanna have suggested that
the phenomenon of reverse cross-listing may be largely motivated by what is
termed "consumer-commercial market bonding." According to Howson and
Khanna, firms' desire to enhance their presence in the foreign market motivates
these firms to utilize foreign listing as a form of advertising to intensify their
local identity and to signal long-term commitment to the local market.1 12 "[F]or
some firms at least, these potential benefits could be enough to outweigh the
potential costs for listing in a market with lesser perceived investor protectors as
originally suggested by the 'legal bonding' hypothesis."''
13
D. GADs: The Insulation Hypothesis
The analysis presented in this Article shows how cross-listing and foreign
incorporation can be used by corporate insiders as a mechanism that insulates
them from hostile takeovers and activist intervention. The utilization of cross-
listing as an antitakeover mechanism builds on the common denominator of
scholarly work stating that cross-listing is not only motivated by liquidity
concerns but also by regulatory considerations. In contrast to the legal bonding
analysis, which explains cross-listing as being motivated by enhancing
shareholder interests, our analysis parallels the avoidance hypothesis, which
notes that cross-listing may be motivated by managerial interests. However,
instead of a managerial desire to lower disclosure requirements and to avoid
stringent corporate governance standards such as insider trading rules, 14 we
focus on the interests of managers in using cross-listing as an entrenchment
device against takeovers and activist intervention.
More importantly, our theoretical framework suggests that almost any
cross-listing or foreign incorporation, even one that involves two jurisdictions
with similar disclosure or governance rules, could become a defensive
mechanism. Such actions have the potential to complicate and increase the
uncertainty of a hostile bid or activist intervention based on even minute
regulatory differences. In some situations, target firms may even have an interest
to cross-list in jurisdictions with more robust disclosure requirements or
governance standards as long as these enhanced listing requirements could serve
as useful entry barriers for potential bidders or activist investors.
Our analysis also addresses the growing phenomenon of reverse cross-
listing, a possibility that the legal bonding and avoidance theories do not account
112. Howson & Khanna, supra note 93, at 625.
113. Id. at 609.
114. See, e.g., Licht, supra note 34, at 150-54, 162; Licht, Managerial Opportunism
andForeign Listing, supra note 98, at 331-46; Licht, Legal Plug-Ins, supra note 98, at 225-30. Licht does
note, although very briefly, the self-interests of a public firm's management to cross-list on a foreign
exchange with more management-friendly rules regulating takeover bids. See Licht, Genie in a Bottle?,
supra note 98, at 93-94. Our detailed analysis of foreign listing as antitakeover device is broader than this,
as it views the mere action of foreign listing as an insulation mechanism, even without regard to the
substantive body of antitakeover law that exists in a given jurisdiction.
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for. The explanation of the phenomenon provided in this Article supplements the
commercial bonding framework. While commercial bonding focuses on the
financial advantages of reverse cross-listing, our analysis explains how this
phenomenon could also be motivated by managerial interests to insulate itself
from the market for corporate control and from external monitoring.
1 15
Interestingly, the stock value of firms that reverse cross-list has not
consistently increased.16 This important finding is in tension with the
commercial bonding hypothesis that reverse cross-listing has commercial value
and should increase a firm's share value. While the benefits gained by reverse
cross-listing may not be reflected in current prices, the insulation theory could
better explain this empirical finding: reverse cross-listing may not necessarily
contribute to the value of the stock because the firms may be motivated by
managerial interests.
The following table summarizes the relationship between the explanation
for cross-listing in this Article and the alternative dominant explanations in the
legal scholarship.
Table 1: Cross-Listing Theories
Traditional Legal Avoidance Commercial GAD
Business Bonding (Licht) Bonding (Kastiel &
Explanations (Coffee) (Howson & Libson)
Khanna)
Stock-value yes yes no yes no
Motivation
Managerial no no yes no yes
Motivation
Cross-listing yes yes yes no yes
Reverse no no no yes yes
Cross-listing
115. Howson and Khanna admit that in some cases the listing on the "weaker" exchange
may surprisingly increase corporate governance regulatory norms. Hypothetically, the India's National
Stock Exchange listing rules can adopt a requirement hat all the directors on the board will be independent
directors under, and the Chinese Securities Regulations Commission did adopt a rule that a third of the
directors should be independent. See Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to Directors of
Listed Companies, CHINA SEC. REG. COMM'N (2001),
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810 69191.html
[https://perma.cc/2XKK-EHUV]; see also Howson & Khanna, supra note 93, at 624. Howson & Khanna
do not attribute much importance to this dynamic; nor do they consider the possibility that such forms of
protections might actually attract foreign firms. Id.
116. See id. at 626-27.
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To be clear, these different heories are not mutually exclusive. For
instance, a decision to cross-list could be motivated by many considerations,
including both commercial bonding and managerial interests. Similarly, even if
the dominant factors in the decision to cross-list are business related, such as the
access to cheap financing or enhancing issuer liquidity, the final implication of
that decision is that management will have increased insulation from external
interventions.
III.The Economic Significance of GADs
This Part discusses the potential incidence of GADs. Section III.A presents
data on the growing activity of cross-listing and global M&A activities,
suggesting that GADs are more prevalent in the U.S. market than initially
presumed. Section 111.B will show how the impact of GADs might extend well
beyond the corporate control market, as it could insulate target firms not only
from takeover activity but also from activist interventions by hedge funds.
A. The Rise of Global M&A and Cross-Listing
Cross-border M&A transactions are on the rise, which in turn raises the
importance of GADs. Cross-border M&A transactions in the last quarter of 2015
reached $597.4 billion in value, a record high.17 In the first quarter of 2016,
cross-border M&A transactions comprised a majority of total global deal value
(53%) for the first time."8' The Baker & McKenzie Cross Border Index, an index
that combines the volume and value of cross border deals, also reached a new
high in the last quarter of 2015.119 This upward trend is not expected to weaken,
but rather to continue. According to a survey conducted in late 2015 among
businesses that were pursuing M&A deals, 88% of respondents reported that they
were planning a cross-border deal, and 41% claimed that they expected to do
multiple cross-border deals in the near future. 1
20




118. Cross Border M&A Index, QI 2016, BAKER & MCKENZIE (2016), http:/s3-eu-
west-i .amazonaws.com/papillon-
local/uploads/6/1 /baker mckenzie global m a index qi 2016 final.pdf [https:Hperma.cc/QU33-
AABU].
119. Megadeals Push Cross-Border M&A Index to Record High, BAKER & MCKENZIE
(2015), https://www.bakermckenzie.co.jp/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2015 Q4 CrossBorderMAIndex Infographic E.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR5R-SVTE].
The score of the index combines the volume and value of cross border deals and attributes greater weight
to cross-region deals than within-region deals. Id. The baseline figure of 100 represents cross-border
activity in 2009. Id.
120. Beyond Borders: The Future of Dealmaking, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (2016),
https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/beyond-borders-the-future-of-dealmaking
[https://perma.cc/C6JV-HVW3]. The survey was conducted in late 2015 and updated in 2016. Id.
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In 2015, half of the largest M&A deals of over $50 billion, which are likely
to involve some stock elements, were cross-border transactions.'2 ' A few
prominent examples are the merger of Anheuser-Busch, a U.S. company, with
SABMiller, a U.K. company,'22 and the acquisition of the U.K. company, BG
group, by Royal Dutch Shell, whose headquarters are located in the
Netherlands.123 China broke its full-year record for annual outbound mergers and
acquisitions less than five months into 2016, reaching a volume of $110 billion,
surpassing the 2015 record of $106.8 billion.1
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This tremendous increase in global M&A activity suggests that GADs may
already be prevalent in the marketplace. A global M&A transaction would
generate an antitakeover mechanism if, after the consummation of the merger,
the combined entity becomes dual-listed or has different incorporation and
listing locations. Since foreign exchanges and jurisdictions have their own
regulatory standards for listed or incorporated firms, any potential acquirer will
have to comply with these additional foreign regulatory equirements.
Obviously, not every global M&A transaction leads to a change in listing
or place of incorporation. When it does, however, the merged entity may end up
with an effective GAD. A review of the publicly traded companies on American
exchanges supports his hypothesis. Many foreign firms seek to list their stock
on a U.S. exchange in addition to, or instead of, listing on the exchange of their
domicile country, and this phenomenon seems to be growing.
As demonstrated in Table 2, there are 791 foreign firms listed on U.S.
exchanges, with a total market capitalization exceeding $7.8 trillion. Of these
firms, 718 are dual-listed both on the U.S. and another foreign exchange. Foreign
cross-listed companies thus constitute 15.8% of all 4,537 companies listed on
U.S. exchanges as of October 2016.125 In other words, almost one of every six
companies listed on American exchanges has a potential GAD in place that
subjects any hostile bid to the rules of the foreign jurisdiction, and often to the
rules of the foreign exchange as well.
121. Andy Kiersz, For the First Year Ever, Global M&A Deals Surpassed $5 Trillion,
BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 28, 2015, 5:35 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ten-biggest-ma-deals-of-2015-
2015-12 [https:Hperma.cc/2Q2E-29VV].
122. Id.
123. Id. The percentage of global deals increases if counting deals that have been
amounted in 2014 but concluded in 2015, a category including the acquisition of Allergan, a U.S.
company, by Actavis, an Irish company based in Dublin. See Richard Summerfield, Actavis Agrees to
Acquire Allergan in $66bn Mega Deal, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE MAG. (Jan. 2015),
https://www.financierworldwide.com/actavis-agrees-to-acquire-allergan-in-66bn-mega-
deal/#.WJ2KTW996M8 [https://perma.cc/CX5A-2E57].
124. Janice Chow, $110.8bn: China Outbound Eclipses Previous Record, DEALOGIC
(May 10, 2016), http://www.dealogic.com/insights/china-outbound-ma-surpasses-annual-levels
[https://perma.cc/F4C5-RH9A].
125. Data on all listed companies in the United States is taken from CRSP/Compustat.
From the total number of 4,973 companies, we removed 436 firms that are traded index funds.
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Table 2: Foreign Ownership and Cross-listing by Jurisdiction
No. of Foreign No. of Cross- Market Cap
CountofIncorporation Companies listed Companies_({$,millions)
Bermuda 60 54 195,870
Brazil 17 17 194,145
British Virgin Islands 16 13 2,882
Canada 79 172 1,176,483
Cayman Islands 101 80 274,370
Ireland 27 22 406,235
Israel 80 70 107,965
Marshall Islands 46 43 18,956
Netherlands 31 31 429,340
United Kingdom 45 43 1,471,358
Other Countries 189 173 3,557,149
Total 791 718 7,834,753
Source: The universe of companies is the CRSP/Compustat Merged database in
2015, retrieved on October 17, 2016; cross-listing data from Thompson Reuters
Datastream, retrieved on October 21, 2016.126
While a typical cross-listing involves a firm from a developing country that
cross-lists on an exchange in a developed country, this is not necessarily the case.
There are also reverse cross-listings, which are traditionally thought to increase
the firm's visibility in the foreign financial and product markets. 127 Indeed, there
is growing interest from U.S. firms and firms in other developed countries, such
as the U.K., in listing on exchanges in developing countries such as India and
China. 128 For instance, by the end of 2010, there were 157 U.S. companies which
had an IPO abroad.129 Fifty U.S. companies are also traded in the Euronext.
130
126. This data includes only non-ADR issuers. We further supported our results by
matching with the data published on NYSE and NADSAQ regarding foreign ownership in these
exchanges. There are 323 foreign companies on the NYSE out of roughly 2,800 companies total. See
Current List of All Non-U.S. Issuers, NYSE (Aug. 2018),
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/data/CurListofallStocks.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK7U-3LDE].
104 out of roughly 3,100 of the firms listed on the NASDAQ stock market are foreign firms. See Non US
Companies, NASDAQ (2018), http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-
industry.aspx?exchange-NASDAQ&market-ADR.
127. See Howson & Khanna, supra note 93, at 625-27.
128. The central example of a foreign firm from an advanced country listed in the Indian
Stock Exchange is the British Banking Firm Standard Chartered Bank. Id. at 608. Regarding other firms
that have expressed interest in listing in the Indian exchange, such as Vodafone, HSBC, and Citibank, see
id. at 616.
129. See Felix Salmon, Chart of the Day: When U.S. Companies lPO Abroad, REUTERS
(May 27, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/ felix-salmon/2011/05/27/chart-of-the-day-when-us-companies-
ipo-abroad [https://perma.cc/8JY3-QPAP] (providing more data on U.S. companies with foreign IPOs).
130. Julius Melnitzer, Euronext Cross-Listing Offers Benefits to U.S. Companies,




Reverse cross-listing on exchanges of developing countries may also be
attractive for firms with financial hardships that encounter difficulties raising
capital in well-developed markets. They may instead be better able to raise
capital in a less-developed exchange trying to attract foreign firms. For example,
there are approximately ten U.S. companies that cross-listed their stock on the
TASE, even though it is a relatively small, liquidity-constrained market.131
In sum, the potential effect of GADs is far from negligible given the
percentage of dual-listed firms and foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges. Each
of these firms is subject to foreign corporate law or the listing rules of a foreign
exchange and thus is less likely to experience a hostile bid. In the next Section,
we demonstrate that the economic effect of foreign listing or incorporation may
extend well beyond the hostile takeover context, as these foreign or dual-listed
firms may also be immune from certain forms of hedge fund activism.
B. GADs as an Anti-Activist Device
In the last decade, activist hedge funds have become critical players in the
corporate governance arena.132 These funds often accumulate large, but non-
controlling, stakes in allegedly underperforming target companies to bring about
change in the target companies' strategic, operational, or financial activity. They
might propose, for example, divesting assets, changing investment or payout
levels, altering the capital structure, or replacing the CEO, often while
threatening to nominate their representatives to the board if target companies are
inattentive to their demands. 133
131. List of Dual-Listed Firms, TEL-AVIV STOCK EXCHANGE,
http://www.tase.co.il/eng/marketdata/stocks/marketdata/pages/marketdata.aspx?action 2. In addition to
Perrigo and Mylan, mentioned above, there are other firms from various sectors: Celsion Ltd. from the
biotech industry, Liveperson Ltd. from the technology industry, and Opko Health Ltd. from the health
industry. Id. The central reason these firms might raise more capital in a small exchange is their inclusion
on the exchange's major indexes, such as the TASE 100 index, which tracks the largest 100 firms listed
on the exchange. Due to its size in comparison to TASE firms, even a relatively small U.S. firm will find
itself in the major indexes. Reverse cross-listing could be especially relevant in the case of fast-growing
start-up firms. These firms may have exhausted the private venture capital markets, but the high costs of
raising capital in U.S. markets could motivate them to raise capital in foreign markets. See Graham
Bowley, Fleeing to Foreign Shores, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/business/global/08exchange.html [https://perma.cc/P4KZ-Y3HF].
132. Up until a decade ago, the general view among corporate law scholars was that
public shareholders are generally passive and suffer from a collective action problem and are therefore
unable to effectively monitor management or controlling shareholders. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN,
REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 204-08 (3d ed. 2009). Institutional investors, who for a short period emerged as the new
hope, also failed to deliver on their promise to provide more disciplined monitoring of management, as
they suffer from inadequate incentives, conflicts of interest, and regulatory constraints. See, e.g., Marcel
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 1021, 1048-57 (2007).
133. For the main characteristics of hedge funds, see Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund
Activism, Corporate Governance, andFirm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1734-36 (2008); for discussion
of the range of operational or financial changes sought by activists, see id, at 1741-45.
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Many scholars consider the emergence of activist hedge funds a major,
groundbreaking shift in the corporate governance of public firms. They explain
that activist hedge funds can now fill the monitoring gap created by rationally
apathetic shareholders by providing a closer check on management action.
134
Consistent with this claim, numerous studies on hedge fund activism find a
correlation between the announcement of interventions by activist hedge funds
and positive stock market reactions.135 Moreover, a study by Lucian Bebchuk,
Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang shows that improved operating performance follows
activist interventions not only in the short term, but also in the long term.
136
Finally, a recent survey of sixty-seven studies on shareholder activism concludes
that hedge fund activism is associated with improvements in share values and
firm operations, and has become more value-increasing over time. 137
However, not everyone sees hedge fund activism as a positive
development. Critics of hedge fund activism claim that hedge fund interventions
are value-decreasing in the long term, and that activists tend to use their power
to force management o disgorge cash in lieu of investing in long-term growth.
138
Other scholars find that the empirical evidence with respect to long-term gains
is mixed and any conclusion that hedge fund activism is efficiency-enhancing is
still premature. 1
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134. Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial
Innovation, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY
CHALLENGES 101 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007) (observing that activist hedge funds
"have shaken up boardrooms and forced radical changes at many publicly-traded firm"). Jonathan Macey,
for instance, claimed that hedge funds "are the newest big thing in corporate governance" and that they
"actually deliver on their promise to provide more disciplined monitoring of management." JONATHAN R.
MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 241,272 (2008). Marcel Kahan
and Ed Rock expressed hope that activist hedge funds "may act 'like real owners' and provide a check on
management discretion." Kahan & Rock, supra note 132, at 1047.
135. See, e.g., Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 133, at 1755-57;
Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J.
CORP. FIN. 323, 328-333 (2008); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism:
Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN., 187, 207-211, 225-226 (2009); see also Robin
Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. FIN. ECON., 362-75 (2009) (finding
that hedge funds specializing in forcing mismanaged target firms into mergers generate significantly
positive returns).
136. Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1101-1121 (2015).
137. Matthew Denes, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Victoria McWilliams, Thirty Years of
Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 405 (2017).
138. For studies invoked by critics of hedge fund activism, see Martin Lipton, Is 2015,
Like 1985, an Inflection Year?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 8, 2015),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/08/is-2015-like-1985-an-inflection-year/
[https://perma.cc/M8ET-ENP6]; see also Ira M. Millstein, Re-examining Board Priorities in an Era of
Activism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2013, 3:52 PM), https:Hdealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/re-examining-
board-priorities-in-an-era-of-activism/ [https://perma.cc/6EVY-JV2Q]; Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple;
Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Feb. 23, 2013), https:Hcorpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-
apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/U7XQ-9KTW].
139. See John C. Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge
FundActivism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 576, 586-587 (2016).
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This Article does not take a position on the value of hedge fund activism.
Regardless of which side of the debate one supports, one thing is clear: activist
hedge funds are important players in the corporate governance arena. The
importance of activist funds is also reflected by the dramatic increase in their
activity over the past fifteen years. Assets managed by activist hedge funds were
worth $23 billion in 2002140 and grew to $126 billion in 2017.141 Moreover,
between 2013 to 2017 alone, 1,151 directors nominated by activist hedge funds
gained board seats across corporate America.
142
The disciplinary effect of hedge fund activism, however, extends well
beyond those hundreds of publicly reported proxy battles. Hedge fund activism
is likely to impact additional companies that are not subject to an engagement as
they operate in the "shadow" of activism, and the mere threat of intervention
induces these potential targets to take measures to improve firm performance or
to distribute cash back to shareholders.
Not surprisingly, public companies and their advisors have been extremely
concerned by hedge fund activism. Prominent lawyers have published
memoranda on the topic, advising their clients on how to protect themselves from
a potential activist attack.143 Leading investment banking firms have established
special groups that advise public companies how to get ready for a "rainy day"
and have a response for an activist intervention prepared.1
44
140. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of
Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 56-58 (2011) (discussing the move of hedge
funds to the center stage).
141. See REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 2017 U.S. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM, SULLIVAN
& CROMWELL LLP 7 (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC Publication Review and Analysis of 2017 US
Shareholder Activism.pdf [https://pema.cc/2U7H-YKG9].
142. Id. at 12.; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keuschd,
Dancing with Activists, 1, 6-14, 20-28 (Harvard Law and Econ. Discussion Paper No. 906, 2017)
(providing data on activists' settlements, their determinants, and subsequent changes to board
composition).
143. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Succeeding in the New Paradigm for Corporate
Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 15, 2016),
https:Hcorpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/15/succeeding-in-the-new-paradigm-for-corporate-governance/
[https://perma.cc/K4RE-DSPC]; Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jun. 2, 2015), https:Hcorpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/02/dealing-
with-activist-hedge-funds-4/ [https://perma.cc/QZL7-MLX9]; see also Ethan A. Klingsberg & Elizabeth
Bieber, Activism in 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 29, 2018),
https:Hcorpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/29/activism-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/6M22-4RLM]; Kai
Haakon E. Liekefett, Think Twice Before Settling with an Activist, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 22, 2016), https:Hcorpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/22/think-twice-
before-settling-with-an-activist/ [https://perma.cc/TWX4-NJPY].
144. Merritt Moran, Ten Strategic Building Blocks for Shareholder Activism
Preparedness, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 20, 2016),
https:Hcorpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/20/ten-strategic-building-blocks-for-shareholder-activism-
preparedness/ [https:Hperma.cc/UVY7-KPRX]; Jim Rossman, Review of Shareholder Activism 1H
2017, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jul. 25, 2017),
https:Hcorpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/25/review-of-shareholder-activism-ih-20 17
[https://perma.cc/UKC4-P3JE]; Gregory Taxin & Betsy Atkins, Activism's New Paradigm, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sep. 28, 2017),
https:Hcorpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/28/activisms-new-paradigm/ [https:Hperma.cc/2V8P-5WLZ].
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Despite the increasing importance of activism, relatively little attention has
been paid in the academic literature to the impact of activists on foreign
companies listed in the U.S. exchanges. Our initial hypothesis is that, all else
being equal, foreign listing and incorporation are likely to reduce the likelihood
of hedge fund activism for three main reasons.
First, exposure to foreign law could generate significant uncertainty and
litigation risks on the activist's side. The activist will have to hire local counsel,
become familiar with the foreign law requirements and may face a risk of
adjudication in foreign courts. The outcome of litigation in a foreign forum may
also be more difficult to predict than in Delaware courts. This increased
uncertainty and the potential exposure to litigation in foreign courts, as well as
the time delay it may cause, could cause activists to be reluctant to engage with
a target that is subject to the corporate and securities regulation of a foreign
jurisdiction.
Second, foreign incorporation or listing forces the activist hedge fund to
comply with the corporate law or the listing requirements of the foreign
jurisdiction or exchange, with all its legal and financial consequences. When
foreign corporate law or listing standards include certain limitations on
shareholder rights, such as the ability to launch a proxy fight, to call a special
meeting, or to file a claim, it could diminish activists' bargaining power vis-a-
vis the target's management.145 This reduced bargaining power, in turn,
decreases the x ante incentives of activists to engage with foreign or dual-listed
targets.
Third, foreign listing standards may have different disclosure requirements.
To the extent the foreign jurisdiction or exchange imposes stricter disclosure
requirements on the accumulation of a non-negligible ownership stake in target
companies, the costs of engagement with the target increases. This is because the
disclosure rules would impose stronger limitations on the ability of activists to
secretly accumulate a significant block before disclosing it to the market.
To be clear, we do not suggest that these additional costs necessarily
preclude any activist engagements in the first place. An activist player will still
choose to engage with a foreign target if the expected benefits from an
engagement are high enough to outweigh the additional engagement costs with
the foreign target. 146 However, foreign incorporation is likely to reduce activists'
ex ante incentives to launch a campaign against a foreign target.
145. See Marco Becht, Julian R. Franks, Jeremy Grant & Hannes F. Wagner, The
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2933, 2945 (2017) ("For
example, the anti-director rights index in Djankov et al. (2008) has as one of its components whether
shareholders have the right to call a special meeting and propose candidates for election to the board.
Across countries, shareholders may require as little as a 5% or as much as a 20% ownership stake to
exercise this right (the United States/Delaware being an exception, where shareholders generally cannot
call an EGM, but can launch a proxy fight).").
146. For a comprehensive analysis as to when shareholder activism is a rational
strategy, see Cheffins & Armour, supra note 140, at 61-68.
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It is also important to recognize that foreign jurisdictions do not always
provide weaker protection to public shareholders than in the United States. To
the contrary, there are certain jurisdictions in which public shareholders are
allowed to appoint their own directors or have the ability to veto certain related-
party transactions. These enhanced shareholder protections, in turn, enhance
(rather than decrease) the potential bargaining power of the activists, and thus on
balance could increase the likelihood of an engagement.
For example, in 2007, Italy passed a regulation that allowed minority
shareholders to appoint their own directors via proportional voting. 147 Research
shows that hedge funds have actively intervened in half of the elections in Italian-
listed companies that are subject to the 2007 regulation.148 In Germany, activist
hedge funds have begun to take advantage of certain provisions of the German
Stock Corporation Law, which provides public holders with the right to
challenge the appropriateness of the consideration paid to them when being
squeezed out pursuant o a domination agreement with a buyer who holds at least
seventy-five percent of the share capital of a target. Evidence shows that in recent
years, this right served as an important channel of activism for hedge funds,
including U.S.-based funds such as Elliott Management.149
Thus, when a foreign jurisdiction affords strong protections to public
shareholders, it could offset, or even outweigh, some of the additional costs
associated with activist engagement in a foreign jurisdiction. But, in the absence
of special shareholder protections, the general hypothesis suggests that an
incorporation in a foreign jurisdiction should make a company less attractive
targets for activists than domestic companies.50 When engagement costs
increase, an activist intervention in a foreign jurisdiction is likely to be less
profitable.
Indeed, a recent comprehensive comparative study by Marco Becht, Julian
Franks, Jeremy Grant, and Hannes Wagner provides empirical support for the
147. Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated Ownership Structure:
An Empirical Analysis of Hedge Fund Activism in Italy and Germany, and Its Evolution, 10 EUR.
COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 328 (2013).
148. See id. at 356-59; see also Massimo Belcredi & Luca Enriques, Institutional
Investor Activism in a Context of Concentrated Ownership and High Private Benefits of Control: The
Case of Italy 14-15 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 225/2013, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 2325421 [https://perma.cc/3A96-Q8NU]
(observing 369 hedge fund transactions with Italian public companies between 2001 to 2013).
149. See Dirk Besse, Shareholder Activism in Germany, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 7, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/06/07/shareholder-
activism-in-germany/ [https:Hperma.cc/3APD-H6AE].
150. As noted, the expected benefit from an activist intervention is a function of both
the probability of success and the increase in the target share price as a result of the intervention. In theory,
one could argue that since certain controlled companies enjoy strong insulation from market mechanisms,
they are, on average, more likely to underperform, and therefore the higher expected returns from an
activist engagement with these companies may compensate, at least partially, for the lower success rate.
However, an activist will prefer to engage with widely held firm if (i) target past performance is held
equal or (ii) if the activist estimates the success probability of a campaign against a controlled company
to be close to zero.
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hypothesis that foreign incorporation or listing could deter or diminish the level
of activism. Their study covers nearly 1,800 engagements by activist hedge funds
in twenty-three countries.151 First, it shows that the vast majority of these
engagements (seventy-six percent) are purely domestic, mostly in the United
States. 152 Second, the authors compare the performance of U.S. activists at home
against their performance overseas and against their foreign peers, who
themselves engage with both domestic and foreign targets. They find that
domestic activism outperforms foreign activism, and this result is similar for
both U.S. and non-U.S. activists. 53 The authors also compare the probability of
achieving outcomes in foreign engagements to the probability of achieving
outcomes in domestic engagements. They "find a strong negative correlation
between both probabilities for the sample of 24 hedge funds, suggesting that
success domestically does not translate into success overseas, and vice versa."'
' 54
Finally, the authors also find that "activists are more likely to target firms
in countries where the rule of law is strong."'' 55 Country characteristics,
according to them, matter for the decision of activists to engage a target, and for
whether an outcome is achieved.56 Along the same lines, another study finds
that "at the entry stage of an activist campaign, activist hedge funds tend to target
companies incorporated in countries with stronger disclosure and shareholder
regimes.
To further explore the potential impact of foreign incorporation on
incidence of shareholder activism, we collected data on "Proxy Fights" and
"Other Stockholder Campaigns" conducted by activist shareholders for the
period from January 2006 through December 2015.158 The Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") requires an investor to file a disclosure
statement on Schedule 13D within ten days after acquiring five percent of a
151. See Becht et al., supra note 145 (researching interventions between 2000-2010).
152. See id. at 2943.
153. See id. at 2936.
154. Id. at 2961.
155. Id. at 2968. However, conditional on observing an engagement, country
characteristics do not correlate with measures of financial performance, such as initial disclosure returns
and outcome disclosure returns.
156. See id.
157. Dionysia Katelouzou, Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism: Dimensions and Legal
Determinants, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 789, 797, 836-39 (2015).
158. SharkWatch, the corporate activism database of SharkRepellent, defines a "Proxy
Fight" as a campaign under which a shareholder or group of shareholders (the "dissident") solicits the
proxy or written consent of fellow shareholders in support of a resolution it is advancing. This usually
involves the election of dissident nominees to the company's Board of Directors in opposition to the
company's director nominees but may also involve campaigns to approve a shareholder proposal or to
vote against a management proposal (including approving a merger). SharkWatch defines "Other
Stockholder Campaign" as "corporate activism made public by activist investors, including hedge funds,
and most commonly involve a dissident agitating for changes with the goal of maximizing shareholder
value or enhancing corporate governance practices .... These campaigns usually take the form of making
communications and letters sent to management at the targeted companies public via 13D filings and press




target's outstanding shares,'59 and those are monitored by SharkWatch, the
corporate activism database of SharkRepellent.160 We merged our data on firms
subject to activism with information obtained from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) on the jurisdiction of incorporation of all companies
listed on U.S. exchanges and separated them into domestic and foreign firms.'
6'
Table 3 below summarizes the results of our examination.
Table 3: Activism with U.S. and Foreign Companies
Foreiiz Incorporated US Ilcorparted
Firms Number of Number of
subject to companies Firms subject to companies in
Year Activism in CRSP Ratio Activism CRSP Ratio
206 6 816 0.01 280 4848 0.06
2007 17 773 0.02 322 4742 0.07
2008 15 738 0.02 336 4456 008
2009 9 708 0.0) 207 4233 0.05
2010 2 716 0.00 211 4097 0.05
2011 2 737 0U)O 224 3989 0.06
2012 5 751 0,01 244 3933 0.06
2013 13 770 0,02 239 3999 0.06
2014 28 802 0.03 331 4142 0,08
2015 3 728 0.04 321 3749 0.09
Average 12 760 0.02 271.5 4218.8 0.06
As shown, companies incorporated outside the United States are less likely
to be subject to activist intervention, although they are not fully insulated from
it. On average, only two percent of the foreign companies faced at least one
activist event during the sample period compared to six percent of the companies
incorporated in the United States.62 This suggests that a domestic firm is three
times more likely than a foreign corporation to be subject to an activist event.
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2018) (requiring
beneficial owners of more than five percent of a voting class of a registered company's equity to file a
Schedule 13D within ten days, reporting the acquisition and other information such as the identity and
background of the acquirer and the purpose of the purchase).
160. See SharkRepellent database, Factset Research Systems, Inc.,
SHARKREPELLENT.NET, https://www.sharkrepellent.net [https://perma.cc/KQC2-7UHM]. The data on
activism from SharkWatch also contains information on events conducted by fifty significant activist
investors even if these activists do not cross the five-percent threshold, and thus are not subject to reporting
requirements. Excluded from the data are "exempt solicitations," which are mostly employed by
institutional investors and not hedge funds. Those solicitations, which are exempt from disclosure rules
pursuant to Rule 14a-2(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, usually involve dissident
communications to shareholders to persuade them to vote for or against a resolution.
161. The universe of companies is the CRSP/Compustat Merged database between
2006-2015.
162. This finding is also in line with a recent study of activist interventions in different
jurisdictions around the world. See Becht et al., supra note 145, at 2938 (finding that hedge fund activism
is more prevalent in the United States than in other countries around the world).
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We receive substantially similar results when limiting the sample to events
conducted only by the fifty largest activist investors. 1
63
These results are further corroborated by running linear logit regressions,
where U.S. incorporation is the independent variable (0 = foreign incorporation;
1 = U.S. incorporation) and the likelihood of an activist event is the dependent
variable. We found that U.S. incorporation produces a positive and statistically
significant effect on the probability that an activist event occurs (Column 1), and
the result remains the same even after controlling for the target firms' market
value, performance at the announcement of the engagement (as measured by
industry-adjusted Tobin Q), and year of the activist event. In particular, we found
that after controlling for above-mentioned factors, a U.S.-incorporated firm is
3.6 times more likely to be subject to an activist event than a target incorporated
in a foreign jurisdiction. 64 Foreign ownership is, therefore, a successful
mechanism for providing target with additional insulation from activism.
Table 4: Results of Regressions
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
US. Corporation 1L352*** 1 2q,* ** 1,345*** 1.28* I296"**
lnMarket Cap) ,0O472** -0.516"* O.4** 4O.05t ***
Indusrty Adjusted
Q -0,0676"** -0,*640*
Ildustry N N Y N N
Year.0510**
Constat 3Q8** .3 9** 4058*** -4,018* 106.6"*
Observations 55490 55423 55307 55333 55333
Pscudo R: 0o14 Q.015 0.032 0.018 0.021
This Table reports coefficients of linear probability regressions where the
independent variable is "U.S. Incorporation," a binary variable equal to 1 if target
was incorporated in the United States. Control variables include company
industry and "In(Market Cap)," defined as the logarithm of a firm's market
capitalization when an engagement starts, firm's performance, as measured by
Industry Adjusted Tobin Q, and year. Finally, *, **, and *** indicate statistical
163. When focusing just on firms that have been the target of an activist campaign by
one of the fifty largest activist investors, we find that the chances of a firm incorporated in the United
States being subject to an activist event are two times higher than those of a foreign corporation. We
examined this subset of firms separately as SharkWatch coverage of activist events by these investors is
generally broader.
164. Data on odds ratios are on file with the authors. Our results stay substantially
similar even if instead of simple linear logit regressions we run rare event logit regressions, as our sample
includes only 128 events with targets that are incorporated outside the United States.
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significance of the coefficients at the ninety percent, ninety-five percent, and
ninety-nine percent confidence levels, respectively.
Finally, to further estimate the overall disciplinary effect of hedge fund
activism on foreign firms, we also examine the success rate of proxy fights
launched against U.S. and foreign firms, as well as the implementation of
activists' demands by target firms. 1
65




Success Rate of Proxy Fights 53,1% 48.4%
Success Rate of Other Solicitations 36.4% 27.3%
As reflected in Table 4, the implementation rate of activists' demands is
higher for American firms than it is for foreign corporations. This disparity
suggests that foreign incorporation has a chilling effect not only on the likelihood
of a target being subject to activism, but also on the likelihood that the activist
demands will be accepted by the target.
Before proceeding, three comments should be made. First, the CRSP
database does not include accurate data regarding the ownership percentage of
controlling shareholders. Thus, there is no control in the regression for ownership
structure. A possible explanation for our results might be that it is more typical
for foreign companies to have a controlling shareholder relative to U.S.
companies. And since activism is more prevalent in companies without a
controlling shareholder, the ownership structure variable (rather the foreign
ownership variable) drives our result.
167
In order to verify that differences in ownership structure are not driving the
disparity between foreign companies and U.S. companies, we have reviewed
165. A proxy fight is considered successful if the dissident wins at least one board seat
or if the target agrees to settle with the activist. Other public solicitation is considered successful if at least
one of the activist's demands is implemented by the target.
166. An event is counted as successful when at least one of the activist's demands is
accepted.
167. See Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled
Companies, 16 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 101, 149-54 (2016) (showing that when activism is conducted
against majority-controlled companies, when the activists have no ability to elect minority directors, the
likelihood of activism reduces dramatically).
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Bloomberg data regarding the ownership structure of foreign companies listed
in the U.S. in 2016. We have examined how many of these foreign companies
have a controlling shareholder. We found that out of the 791 foreign firms, only
112 have some form of a controlling shareholder, constituting approximately
14% of the firms above.168 The percentage of foreign firms with a controlling
shareholder for the year examined does not seem to exceed the percentage of
firms with controlling shareholders reported in other studies.169 It could be
inferred that ownership structure does not seem to be driving our findings
regarding the gap between foreign firms in comparison to firms in general. To
completely rebut this hypothesis would require more systematic analysis of the
ownership structure of sampled firms in all examined year.
Second, our research does not control for the legal characteristics of
specific countries related to activist engagements due to sample size issues.
However, the study by Becht et al. does so. Their results show that "activists are
more likely to target firms in countries where the rule of law is strong; consistent
with this, activism is rare in emerging markets."' 17 They also find that "activism
is more frequent in those developed countries (e.g., France, Germany, and Italy)
in which minimum regulatory disclosure thresholds for blockholders are low.'
17
1
An interesting avenue for future research could focus on the potential impact of
the specific legal characteristics of a jurisdiction on the level and success rate of
activism.
Third, some activist funds could be repeat players that specialize in
engagements in foreign jurisdictions.'72 In the case of these repeat players, one
would expect that the costs of activism abroad would decrease over time due
their accumulated knowledge and experience in the foreign jurisdiction. Another
interesting avenue for future research would be to explore the potential impact
of activists' experience in a foreign jurisdiction on the level and success rate of
activism.
In sum, the data presented in this Section provides preliminary evidence
that foreign corporations could enjoy additional insulation from activist hedge
funds. This view is also supported both by recent empirical research on
shareholder activism around the world as well as by some preliminary evidence
168. Top 20 Holders Public Filings, BLOOMBERG L.P. (2017) (for dual-listed firms of
2016) (retrieved on December 20, 2017). Initially we found that out of the 791 foreign firms, only 99 of
them have a controlling shareholder holding 30% or more of the firm's outstanding shares. To get the full
picture of the number of firms with a controlling shareholder, we also examined firms that are controlled
through a dual-stock structure. Thirty-three of the firms examined have such a structure, from which only
one in thirteen firms there is a controlling shareholder.
169. See, e.g., Kastiel, supra note 167, at 125-26 (finding that in the Russell 3000, there
are 529 companies with shareholders holding 30% of the votes, which constitute 17% of the companies
on the index).
170. Becht et al., supra note 145, at 2968.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 149 (providing the example of Elliott Management, which engaged
with multiple German targets).
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presented in this Section. We also highlight a number of interesting avenues for
future research on hedge fund activism with foreign companies.
IV. Implications
A. Implications for Competition Between Exchanges
The globalization of financial markets has a great impact not only on issuers
but also on regulators and exchanges. The mobility of corporations in a global
world enables them to "mix and match" regulatory arrangements, which in turn
affects regulators and exchanges that compete to attract corporations. This global
regulatory competition framework has been applied to various fields, such as
environmental regulation, 17 3 tax, 174 and, of course, corporate and securities
regulation. 175
In a corporate regulatory setting, the corporation can mix and match
elements from different jurisdictions and form its own regulatory package.
17 6
The possibility of listing stock in a different jurisdiction than the jurisdiction of
incorporation or corporate residence is a key factor that enables a corporation to
tailor regulations to their benefit. Most of the scholars that apply the framework
of regulatory competition in the realm of securities regulation have viewed its
basic dynamic as eliminating excess regulation and lowering regulatory
standards. Some scholars have suggested an "issuer choice" approach, under
which a firm could select its securities regulator from a list of American and
foreign jurisdictions.17 7 Other scholars who object to regulatory competition in
the realm of securities regulation foresee it generating a race to the bottom, in
which the willingness to attract foreign companies might cause exchanges to
relax their listing standards. 
178
173. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
"'Race to the Bottom " Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
174. See, e.g., John D. Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 269
(1999).
175. See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of
Corporate Law, 22 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 419-20 (2006).
176. Regarding the possibility to mix-and-match in the tax context, see Tsilly Dagan,
Pay as You Wish: Globalization, Forum Shopping, and Distributive Justice (June 10, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract 2457212 [https://perma.cc/MC6J-QRH3].
177. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2427 (1998); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in
International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001). For a similar view, see
Stephen Choi & Andrew Gozman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 922-24 (1997). An additional advantage of regulatory competition is
its ability to decrease systematic risk in fields such as financial regulation. See Roberta Romano, For
Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing andRecalibrating the Basel
Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2014).
178. See Merritt Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563
(200 1); see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to
Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999).
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The analysis in this Article further complicates this taxonomy. In particular,
the proliferation of inversions and cross-listings could lead to a change in the
dynamic of inter-exchange competition in two central aspects. To begin, since
GADs provide a motivation for listing on an exchange other than liquidity
concerns, it opens up the possibility that a large firm will choose to list at least
some of its shares in a small exchange even when the small exchange does not
have sufficient liquidity to satisfy the large firm's needs. A large firm could list
the vast majority of its equity capital on a large exchange to satisfy its liquidity
needs and the rest of its stock on a small exchange in order to obtain an effective
GAD. While small exchanges will not be able to attract large firms as the locus
of the firm's primary listing, they may be able to acquire portions of these firms
by shifting the listing location of a small, but still sizable, amount of stock 179
Furthermore, issuers' demand for GADs could incentivize foreign
exchanges and regulators to supply these devices. There are several ways in
which exchanges and regulators could induce cross-listing by offering a legal
framework that enhances the operation of GADs. First, regulators of foreign
jurisdictions could adopt entrenchment mechanisms such as the stichting
mechanism used in the Netherlands, which provides firms that decide to re-
incorporate in a foreign jurisdiction with powerful protections against hostile
bids.8 0
Second, foreign regulators could eliminate or minimize the exemption for
filing a prospectus in a foreign jurisdiction'8' so that a hostile bidder will be
forced to make a public offering to holders of shares traded in the foreign
exchange even if they hold an extremely small fraction of the firm's equity
capital. At the extreme, foreign regulators could also state that any open offer of
shares to its citizens would be considered as a public offering and would be
subject to the disclosure requirements of the foreign jurisdiction.8 2
179. If large firms are more likely to list a fraction of their equity capital in smaller
exchanges, then domestic investors who invest through foreign large exchanges may reinvest through the
local small exchange for diversification. This potential change in the behavior of investors could affect
the liquidity in each type of the exchanges: increasing the liquidity in small ones and decreasing the
liquidity in large ones.
180. Recently, the stichting has become a tool of choice for multinational corporations
to protect against a hostile takeover. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
181. In the United States, for instance, if a target is a foreign private issuer and U.S.
security holders hold ten percent or less of the class of securities sought in the offer, the bidder is not
required to comply with the specific disclosure provisions of the U.S. tender offer rules. See Cross-Border
Business Combination Transactions, supra note 37, at 2. Other jurisdictions can have more restrictive
arrangements in place. For instance, the principle of equal treatments of target's shareholders, provided
for by the EU Takeover Directive, severely limits the ability of a bidder to exclude foreign shareholders.
See Mucciarelli, supra note 37, at 13-15.
182. This could lead to an absurd requirement that a large share of the most significant
mergers and acquisitions in the United States will require a prospectus in a third country because a few
shareholders of the target firm are residents of that third country. For example, in the Merger of Bank of
America and Merrill Lynch, Bank of America sent a letter to the Israel Securities Authority to inquire
whether it would need to publicize a prospectus in Israel. See Response of Securities Authority to Bank of
America's Inquiry from Oct. 12, 2008, ISR. SEC. AUTH. (Oct. 12, 2008),
http://www.isa.gov.il/Download/IsaFile 4177.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWG3-MW82]. Bank of America
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Third, regulators and exchanges could complicate, or even enhance,
disclosure requirements in order to provide potential targets with protections
from hostile bidders or activist shareholders. For instance, regulators could adopt
early disclosure requirements for accumulation of ownership stake, and thereby
imposing significant costs on future potential activist shareholders.
Finally, different exchanges could have regulations that would attract
different types of target firms interested in GADs. For example, in the Perrigo-
Mylan case noted above, one of the hurdles Mylan faced was that it had a poison
pill and two separate classes of securities.183 Since Israeli law prohibited the use
of dual-class stock, and there was ambiguity as to whether that law also applies
to poison pills, that prohibition hindered Mylan's ability to smoothly list its
shares on the TASE. 184 Therefore, exchanges that ban firms with antitakeover
provisions will be attractive to targets that are anticipating hostile bids from firms
that do have such provisions. Thus, the market for GADs could be fragmented
according to the various features of the potential targets and the potential
bidders.'8 5
B. Policy Implications
In this Part, we will point to three central measures that regulators and
investors who are interested in limiting the antitakeover effect of GADs could
take.
offered Merrill Lynch shareholders shares of its stock as part of the merger. See Matther Karnitschnig,
Carrick Mollenkamp & Dan Fitzpatrick, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch in Merger Talks, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 14, 2008 8:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 122142278543033525
[https://perma.cc/H9S4-YVQY]. The Israeli Securities Law defines any offer made to more than 35 of its
residents as a public offer that requires a prospectus. See Securities Law, § 15(a), supra note 18. This raised
a question as to whether this merger would require a prospectus in Israel. The Securities Authority
published a decision that exempted firms from this requirement when the firm making the offer has no
special relationship to the state and no special marketing efforts were exerted in relation to Israeli
shareholders. See Decision in the Corporate Domain o. 2008-0: When Does an Offering ofRights, Barter
Acquisition Offer or Stock Tracing as Part of a Merger by a Foreign Firm, Will Not Count as a Public
Offer According to the Securities Law, ISRAEL SEC. AUTH. (Oct. 22, 2008),
http://www.isa.gov.il/sites/mt/Download/IsaFile 3333.pdf While in this case no requirement for a
prospectus was imposed, it demonstrates the reach of a foreign securities law and how it could be utilized
even as it relates to firms that have no direct connection to the state.
183. CC (TA) 40274-09-15 Perrigo Co. v. Mylan N.V. (Takdin), at 21 (2015) (Isr.).
184. Id.
185. Even given these limitations, the scope of the protection is wider than what it
seems. Protecting from potential acquirers that have an antitakeover measure covers a large array of the
potential threats for the target. Empirical findings indicated that firms with antitakeover provisions are
more likely to be a bidder. See Jarrad Harford et al., The Sources of Value Destruction in Acquisitions by
Entrenched Managers, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 247, 248 (2012). Furthermore, even if such protections do not
cover all takeover threats, they tend to distinguish between the "bad bidders" that will not add value to
the firm and "good bidders" who may add value. See Mark L. Mitchel & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders
Become Good Targets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 372 (1990); David Offenberg, Firm Size and the Effectiveness of
the Market for Corporate Control, 15 J. CORP. FIN. 66 (2009). Thus, by enabling only firms without
antitakeover measures to takeover listed firms, the exchanges make sure that the disciplinary mechanism
of taking over the bidder will be effective.
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1. Alerting Market Participants
The antitakeover and anti-activist element that GAD generates is not
immediately apparent.8 6 This is in contrast to traditional antitakeover
measures such as poison pills and staggered boards.'8 As a result,
investors, advisory firms, and regulators do not exert pressure against
a firm's decision to cross-list even when they strongly object o other
antitakeover and anti-activist measures.'88 Moreover, they mostly
view cross-listing decisions positively due to their advantages for
shareholders. 8 9
The fact that the antitakeover and anti-activist dimension of cross-listing
and inversions is widely ignored is reflected in the questionnaires advisory firms
use to rank the quality of firms' corporate governance. In a typical questionnaire
section regarding takeover defenses, there is no reference to cross-listing or
foreign incorporation.90 A World Bank affiliate's report on corporate
governance scorecards overlooks cross-listing or foreign incorporation in its
analysis of antitakeover measures.191 As noted above, academic corporate
governance indexes such as the Entrenchment Index and G-Index also ignore the
effect cross-listing or foreign corporate residence may have on the antitakeover
or anti-activist defense level of the firm.'
92
One major goal of this Article is, therefore, to increase the awareness of
market participants of the use of cross-listing and foreign incorporation as an
antitakeover and anti-activist measure. Advisory firms' questionnaires should
determine whether the company is cross-listed and in what exchange. They
should also inquire regarding the exposure of the firm to foreign legal norms and
their potential effect on takeovers and activist engagement. In advising
shareholders regarding a vote for hiring or laying off a director, they should take
into account his or her role in a decision of a GAD-suspicious cross-listing.
Academic governance indexes should also analyze and track GADs'
potential effects, as these indexes have a pivotal role in influencing parameters
of advisory firms. As academic studies find more evidence of the defensive
impact of cross-listing and exposure to foreign legal systems, advisory firms will
186. See supra Section I.D.1.
187. See id.
188. See infra notes 190-192.
189. See supra notes 90-92.
190. See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, ISS QUALITYSCORE: OVERVIEW
AND UPDATES, NOVEMBER 2016, at 47-70 (2016),
https://www.isscorporatesolutions.com/file/documents/QualityScore/o20Techdoc%/o20Nov2O16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QT2-4BG6] (including seven relevant factors, none of which implicate GADs).
191. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORECARDS: ASSESSING AND PROMOTING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF CODES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, INT'L FIN. CORP. 64 (2014) (failing to
mention cross-listing or corporate residence on the Vietnamese scorecard).
192. See supra notes 78-79.
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have a greater tendency to incorporate this dimension in their recommendation
and governance metrics, and vice versa.
2. Global Cooperation
Cross-listing and inversions motivated by GAD considerations could be
curtailed by international cooperation of exchanges or jurisdictions. Regulators
and exchanges could agree to streamline the process of extending offerings to
shareholders in another jurisdiction. This could be done through standardization
of lower disclosure and other governance requirements for extending an offer to
shareholders on other exchanges. For example, the Euronext only requires a U.S.
cross-listed firm to file the firm's annual 10-K or 20-F U.S. form together with
a minimal prospectus summary, which can use the U.S. GAAP accounting
standard as opposed to IFRS.193 It could also be done by a multilateral
arrangement, as with the United States and Canada stipulating a waiver from
soliciting the votes in two different exchanges if the percentage of shares held in
the secondary listing place falls below a certain threshold.
194
An international standard for exchanges is a network product. Participation
in a network confers significant benefits on actors within the network, increasing
their compatibility with other users.19 By deviating from the accepted standard,
the actor will be isolated from the network and lose the benefits that stem from
participation in the network. A similar effect is found in the tax context: even
though the interests of developing countries and developed countries regarding
international taxation are different, developing countries still adopt the
international taxation standards developed countries prefer in the treaties they
sign.196 This is mainly because they want to be part of the network to which the
developing countries belong. The same can be true for exchanges and
jurisdictions that may benefit from supplying GADs: the cost of deviating from
the common standards of the network of exchanges may be greater than the
benefits.
3. Selective Application of the Enhanced Business Judgment Rule
An additional venue for addressing GADs is the application of judicial
review. As mentioned above, one of the main features of GADs is that they are
unlikely to be exposed to judicial review through the application of the enhanced
193. Fast Path, EURONEXT, https://www.euronext.comn nl/listings/international-
listings/fast-path [https://perma.cc/DT7X-YBDS].
194. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(g) (2018).
195. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition &
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1984).
196. For example, the BEPS agreement for the sharing of information between
jurisdictions regarding taxpayers serves the interests of developed countries but does not serve the
interests of developing countries. See Tsilly Dagan, Tax Treaties as a Network Product, 41 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 5 (2016).
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business judgment rule (EBJR).197 This is in contrast to the adoption of
conventional antitakeover and anti-activist mechanisms, which are covered by
the EBJR.198 Although it would be problematic to apply the EBJR to all cross-
listings and corporate inversions, it may be possible to apply it to certain
suspicious cross-listings and inversions, in which circumstances clearly point to
an anti-activist motive behind the firm's actions. Certain jurisdictions may
"specialize" in providing a GAD mechanism, especially when they have nothing
else substantial to offer firms, such as significant liquidity or increased
visibility. 199 The SEC can identify such jurisdictions, and the EBJR could be
extended to cover decisions to list or perform a conversion in such jurisdictions.
This expansion of judicial review strikes a balance between the desire to
tighten regulation on the potential utilization of GADs without imposing stricter
judicial review on all decisions to cross-list. However, the efficacy of such a
measure depends on whether it is possible to identify jurisdictions in which the
cross-listing or inversion activity is "GAD-driven."
V. Conclusions
This Article explores a "hidden" mechanism that provides management
with additional insulation from market disciplinary forces: the global
antitakeover device. The potential economic impact of GADs is significant, as a
surprisingly large percentage of firms traded on U.S. exchanges are incorporated
outside the U.S. or are dual-listed. Therefore, any hostile engagement with these
firms is also subject to foreign law and creates complexity, time delay and
uncertainty. Moreover, the impact of these global devices might extend beyond
the corporate control market, as GADs could also create a partial insulation from
the most important disciplinary force in the U.S. capital market: activist hedge
funds. Nonetheless, its defensive impact has flown under the radar of academics,
courts, investors, and advisors.
Our analysis also raises an important policy question for future research:
what measures should regulators and investors, who object to the use of
antitakeover mechanisms, take in order to mitigate the impact of GADs? We
have offered three type of solutions: increased awareness of the potential impact
of GADs by market participants and academics; enhanced judicial scrutiny of
cross-listing and foreign incorporation decisions; and international cooperation.
In future work, we hope to analyze more closely how each of these solutions,
particularly international cooperation, should be tailored in order to address
GADs.
197. See supra notes 81-85.
198. See supra note 81.
199. See supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
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